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This paper deals with the issues arising 
out of the special status of the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man in the fields 
of Constitutional, International and 
European Law.
The wortc has Deen undertaken in the 
context of a more general study, for the 
purposes of a doctoral thesis, on the 
subject of dependent and diminutive territories 





















































































































































































Chapter 1 - Introduction and Historical Background
I. Introduction
In this paper, I propose to examine the legal aspects 
of the special status enjoyed by the Isle of Man and the 
Channel Islands as internally self-governing territories of 
the British Isles.
Major emphasis will be placed on the special relation­
ship which was negotiated on behalf of the Islands when 
Britain acceded to the European Communities and in part­
icular the operation of the provisions in practice.
Firstly, however, I shall consider the Islands in the 
context of their status within the British constitutional 
system since the principles which govern this relationship 
are the cornerstones of any study in a related field such 
as the European Communities.
In addition, the following two international law aspects 
will be treated:- i) The effect of growing international 
regulation on the Islands* constitutional relationship with 
the United Kingdom, ii) The possibility of categorising the 
Islands in international legal terms and an assessment of whether 
3uch a categorisation coincides with any internal constitutional 
definition arrived at. This should allow one to reach certain 




























































































II. The Isle of Man - Historical Background
The Isle of Man, situated in the Irish Sea and almost 
equidistant from the four 'home' countries of the United 
Kingdom, boasts one of the oldest Parliaments in the world 
and has a history of political autonomy which has survived, 
although not entirely unscathed, the forces which unified the 
British Isles politically in the past millenium. In this 
respect, it is unique - all the other island groups with 
similar Nordic and/or Celtic backgrounds have found them­
selves incorporated into the unitary state of Great Britain 
and in the process, have been relegated to the status of 
local authority areas with powers derived solely from and 
vulnerable to the Westminster Parliament.
While never totally suppressed, Manx independence has 
not, in recent history, amounted to complete unfettered sover­
eignty and the British Government, operating through the 
Monarch as 'Lord of Man' has, from time to time, imposed its 
will on the Island.
Their principal action in this respect, came in the 
acquisition of the Lordship by the Crown in 1765'*'. This was 
done by what was effectively an ultimatum to the existing 
Lord, the Duke of Atholl and was accompanied by legislative 
enactments which curtailed the independent sovereignty 
which the Lord had exercised together with Tynwald, the Manx 
Parliament.
The purpose of these measures was to put to an end the 




























































































a measure of prosperity to the Island at the expense of
2the British Exchequer .
Manx law had previously been amended to encourage trade 
in goods which were ultimately destined to oe smuggled to 
Britain and, on account of the revenue which accrued to 
the Island from this commerce, the activity was acquiesced 
in by successive Lords of Man.
In 1767, the British Government also imposed taxation
over tne heads of Tynwald and this can proDably be regarded
3as the low point in Manx autonomy:.
The last two centuries has seen the Manx Parliament 
gradually regain its lost powers, while at the same time 
undergoing a popular démocratisation reflecting the franchise 
reforms which occurred in the U.K. in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.
During the nineteenth century, a practice developed in 
the Isle of Man which illustrates their continuing capacity 
to extract financial advantage out of their legal and 
physical separation from the United Kingdom. The Island 
attracted significant numoers of immigrants from England who 
were bad debtors and whose creditors were unaDle to pursue 
them. Since these people generally brougnt money with them 
and hence, contriouted to the Manx economy, laws were 
passed to protect them4 This disreputable practice was 
ended after a time.
Today the Island is once again in the position of offering 
a favourable financial environment due to its low and 
relatively uncomplicated tax structure and it is this which 




























































































The Isle of Man has a distinctly separate legal system
tne foundation of which is its customary or 'breast' law^.
Accordingly, there are certain fundamental differences^
oetween the Manx and English legal systems although overall,
there are Droad areas of similarity. Nowadays, legislation
is the more important source of law and this originates
at Westminster or, more commonly, in the local Manx legis-
7lature, Tynwald'
III. The Channel Islands - Historical Background
The Channel Islands, which lie offthe North-West coast
of France, have a somewhat different history. They are the
only remnants of the Duchy of Normandy still under the
Engliah Crown having initially oeen attached in 1106 and
formally annexed in 1254. They have never been incorporated
however, into the English (or United) Kingdom and accordingly:
"...the right of the Sovereign to legislate by Order 
in Council...is based on the powers exercised by the
gDukes of Normandy" .
The Common Law of the Islands is the 'ancienne coutume' of
5atne Duchy of Normandy although this has, of course, been 
superceded in large measure over the centuries, by the 
development of local customs, insular legislation and 
Orders in Council emanating from London.
The Channel Islands have traditionally enjoyed a 
substantial degree of local independence and this has oeen 
consolidated by successive English monarchs, anxious to





























































































was consistent with the constitutional rights of the Island'!''*.
Clearly, this view may be held to apply equally to 
Guernsey which has acquired analogous Charter rights over 
the centuries.
In essence, therefore, the Islands' existing independence 
results, not from the gradual acquisition of competences 
previously exercised by the metropolitan power, but from 
the continued guarantee of a pre-existing sovereignty. 
Admittedly, this has been adapted to meet the changing 
circumstances of democratic evolution but it remains, in
14principle, as a result of the maintenance of the status quo
IV. Summary
Notwithstanding their different historical backgrounds,
it would be difficult nowau. to justify drawing any
practical distinctions between the Channel Islands and the
Isle of Man, in terms of their relationship with the United
Kingdom and they may be treated together for most purposes.
The historical differences, however, should not be
completely ignored since they may offer some explanation
for the different attitudes which are adopted in the Islands.
Until very recently, the Isle of Man could be said to have
been 'catching up' on the Channel Islands, as far as
15domestic autonomy is concerned and in certain other 
respects, it continues to lag behind^.
Clearly, it is also important to treat the Islands of 
Jersey and Guernsey separately since they form independent 




























































































This sensitivity to Island opinion was manifested in
Qvarious Royal Charters which exempted the Islands from 
English taxation, provided unrestricted access to English 
markets and, in general, laid the foundations for their 
present domestic autonomy^.
Tne immunity granted to insular products from English, 
and later U.K., customs duties was historically, perhaps the 
most significant privilege granted to the Islands and this 
ancient right has been reaffirmed several times in subsequent 
legi slation11.
Nowadays, however, one would probably identify the 
Islands' fiscal autonomy as the single most important 
factor contributing to their present economic strength.
It would appear that the internal independence of the 
Islands rests on a firmer legal and historical foundation 
than that of the Isle of Man. This was illustrated in a 
successful petition presented to the Privy Council by the 
States (Parliament) of Jersey in 1853 , following an 
attempt to impose three Orders in Council on the Island.
These were aimed at reforming Jersey's .judicial and police 
system and the costs incurred were to be borne by the 
States. The States, however, refused to put these orders 
into effect, citing the Island's immunity from British 
taxation as their justification. They were willing, instead 
to implement their own legislation which differed in 
certain respects. The Privy Council's conclusion 
was that there were serious doubts whether the use of the 




























































































matters, not least with regard to the question of EEC accession. 
The other two Channel Islands with a substantial measure 
of self-government are Alderney and Sark, both of which 
have small populations and only limited economic activity.
For this reason, they will not be considered as such. In 
most respects, the issues raised which affect the two largest 
Channel Islands are similarly pertinent to the smaller islands 
in the group.
Some basic facts about the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey 
are set out in Appendix I.
Chapter 1 - Footnotes.
1. The Isle of Man Purchase Act, 1765 (5 Geo.3 c 21)
2. See R.H. Kinvig, The Isle of Man - A Social, Cultural and 
Political History p.120
3. 1767 (7 Geo.3 c 45)
4. Kinvig supra p.132
5. So called Decause it is 'the law residing in the breasts 
of the judges' See K.R. Simmonds, The British Islands
and the Community, II - The Isle of Man, 7 C.M.L.Rev. 1970 
p.454 at 457
6. The Manx have their own distinct law of real property..
For a brief comparison of Manx and English law, see 
Chloros, Bibliographical Guide to the Law of the United 
Kingdom, Channel Islands and Isle of Man, p.237
7. For a more comprehensive constitutional history of the 




























































































Case Study of the Isle of Man, Chapter 3 and 4.
8. From Volume 6 of the Minutes of Evidence taken before 
the Commission on the Constitution, p.228, Memorandum 
by the States of Guernsey submitted on the 28th April,
1970.
8a The principal codification of this is 'Le Grand Coustumier 
du Pays et Duche de Normandie' published in 1539. See,
K.R. Simmonds, the Law of the Channel Islands, III Some 
Aspects of the Application of United Kingdom Legislation 
to the Channel Islands, The Solicitor Quarterly, 1963(2), 
pp.33-46
9. In particular, a Royal Charter granted by Elizabeth I in 
1559 which consolidated and extended the rights and 
privileges of Channel Islanders.
10. See Colin Powell, The Channel Islands and the Common Market, 
the Three Banks Review, 1972, NumDer 95, page 49 at the 
Introduction.
11. In particular, the following three Acts:
- An Act for continuing the duties on malt...and to obviate 
a doubt concerning goods imported from the Islands of 
Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark, 1716 (3 Geo.l c 4)
- The Customs Consolidation Act, 1876 s.156
- the Customs and Excise Act, 1952, 8.37
12. In re the States of Jersey (1853) 9 Moo. P.C.C. 187
13. ibid at p.262
14. For a more comprehensive constitutional history of Jersey, 
see the Jersey Report, 1967 Section C at p.42, commissioned 




























































































14. For instance, until recently, the Manx Lieutenant- 
Governor was far less of a figurehead than his Channel 
Islands counterparts. It was only in 1980 that he ceased 
to preside over sittings of the Legislative Council.
15. This is particularly so in the field of finance. The 
Isle of Man is considerably less developed as a financial 
centre and is some way behind in the legislative area. e.g. 
with regard to Depositor Protection.
16. Alderney (population 2,000) and Sark (population 500), 
togetner with the smaller Channel Islands of Herm, Jethou, 
Lihou and Brechou, are dependencies of Guernsey. Sark is 
largely autonomous except with regard to certain criminal 
matters, and has its own legislature called the Chief Pleas. 
Alderney has its own States, out also has two representative 
in the Guernsey States, the latter being responsible for 



























































































Chapter 2 - The Relationship between the Islands and the
United Kingdom; a study of the Constitutional Situation
1. Introduction
In embarking upon an examination of the constitutional 
situation of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, it is 
necessary at the outset, to distinguish between two avenues of 
inquiry which exist, the first dealing with the internal constit­
utional situation of the Islands and the second with the rules 
and conventions which govern their relations with the United 
Kingdom.
Whilst there is clearly some interaction between these two 
fields, they may to a large extent be assessed separately. The 
former involves consideration of traditional constitutional 
legal theory encompassing the scope of powers of the insular 
authorities vis a vis individuals under their jurisdiction.
The latter is, in essence, a study of inter-governmental 
relations and accordingly, is more concerned with the delimit­
ation of powers between different authorities.
There are two principal ways in which these fields may be seen 
to overlap. Firstly, where a constitutional link exists between 
the .citizens of the Islands and the metropolitan government^- and 
secondly, in the sense that the insular governments are 
constrained in their actions vis a vis individual islanders 
by the checks imposed on them in their relationship with the 
United Kingdom.
Examples of this interaction are assessed in the following 



























































































of the constitutional system mentioned, namely the relationship 
between the two principal political authorities operating in 
this arena. A brief review of the internal constitutional 
structure of the Islands is to be found at Appendix VI.
The first step will be to look at the Islands' classification 
under the U.K. Constitution as 'dependencies of the Crown' and 
whether the term used is indicative of a precise legal form or 
of a more general concept encompassing a wider range of entities 
with a particular common characteristic.
I will then consider in greater detail, the agreed principles
of the relationship, the principles over which there is some
dispute and the dichotomy which arises in this field, using as
a reference point, the governmental inquiries which were conducted
2in the late 1960s and early 1970s . It is important to recognise 
that, in these inquiries, attention tended to be focussed upon 
aspects of the system over which there was disagreement. In 
order to put these in context, it is therefore appropriate to 
describe the central aspects of the relationship in its normal 
functioning. It should be emphasised from the beginning that the 
relationship between the Islands and the U.K. is a highly stable 
one and the problem areas constitute exceptions to a general 
rule of harmony.
This will be followed by an examination of insular autonomy, 
concentrating on three specific subjects which have resulted in 
disagreements between Britain and the Islands in the past:
(i) 'Non-interference' by Westminster and the extent to which 
this has become a binding norm or convention (ii) The question 
of access for the Islands to judicial protection for their 





























































































With respect to these three areas, the final outcome of the 
argument must be seen in the light of British constitutional 
theory and practice, and this will be considered.
On a more general level, it should be possible to assess, 
from a historical point of view, the present nature of insular 
autonomy.
Finally, I will return to the question of terminology in seeking 
to characterise the Islands' constitutional status by reference 
to their relationship with the United Kingdom, and to existing 
legal forms which are adopted by states for the government and 
administration of territories over which they exercise sovereignty.
II. Dependencies of the Crown
The formal constitutional definition of the status of the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man is that they are 'dependen­
cies of the Crown' which are neither colonies nor part of the 
United Kingdom . This special link with the Crown, as distinct 
from absorption or annexation by the British state, is one 
which the Islanders are keen to stress and there is a tendency, 
therefore, to reject the existence of any constitutional link 
with the Government of the U.K.^ This may be the case in theory 
but in’practice, the very fact that the Islands owe allegiance 
to the Sovereign offers a legal avenue for the British 
Government to involve itself in their affairs.
In reality, the Crown is the least powerful element in 
the United Kingdom's tri-partite Parliamentary system. By 




























































































Ministers and the exercise of tne Crown prerogative is 
controlled oy tne Caoinet.
In contrast to Westminster legislation, there is no
convention which requires the sovereign to give the Royal
Assent to insular legislation and, on the advice of her Privy 
5Councillors , sne will withhold such assent if the measure 
appears repugnant to the British Government^.
Similarly, the Queen is unaole independently to refuse the 
passage of an Order in Council, the device used to extend 
Westminster legislation to the Islands.
Thus, for practical purposes, one must accept the indivisibility 
of the Sovereign and the British Government where insular matters 
are concerned and, arising out of this, tnere is clearly a 
legal relationsnip Detween the Islands and tne metropolitan 
government. Accordingly, there is little to De gained in 
distinguishing 'dependencies of the Crown' from other dependencies 
of the United Kingdom, at least in terms of the control which may 
be exercised from Westminster. While the formal procedures may 
differ the scope of action of the U.K. cannot De presumed from 
the terminology employed.
The next stage is to consider whether a legal definition 
exists for the term 'dependency'. In tnis respect, there is 
little to De gained from an examination of the international legal 
doctrine. The term is not utilised in this sphere for the 
tecnnical- purpose of portraying a particular defined set of legal 
and constitutional circumstances. Indeed, tnere are very few 
writers who utilise the word except in the purely descriptive 
sense to indicate the existence of a relationship between two 




























































































full attributes of sovereignty .
As is discussed in Chapter 3, attempts at more precise 
terminology are not always successful. Notwithstanding this,
g
it may be asserted that ’dependent states' , 'non-self-governing 
territories'^, 'colonies'1*1, 'protectorates'11 etc. (terms which 
are Dy no means mutually exclusive), all display in their 
constitutional structures, elements of dependency in a legal 
sense.
Tnere may, of course, be a further form of dependency estab­
lished Detween sovereign states. This may be termed 'factual 
dependency' and will generally occur where a weaker state finds 
itself economically dependent upon a more powerful one. Such a 
situation may be said to characterise the relations between ex- 
colonial powers and many of their recently independent colonies.
In order to outain a more precise definition of 'dependency', 
it is worth looking at the constitutional practice and usage of 
existing metropolitan powers. From an examination of the termin­
ology employed, it is clear that the term is used in the legal 
sense, only by the United Kingdom to describe its non-metropolitan 
territories. Australia and the United States have 'external 
territories', New Zealand uses the term 'associated territories' 
while the French expression is 'territoires d'outre-mer'.
In the U.K. context, the word is also employed in relation to 
very small entities in special relationship with a larger 
territory which is, itself in a situation of legal dependence 
vis a vis Britain. Thus, South Georgia, Ascension Island and 
Alderney are dependencies of the Falkland Islands, St. Helena 
and Guernsey respectively.





























































































it is used in the British constitution, anything other than 
a loose legal meaning. A 'dependency' in fact, may be any territory 
which is not fully sovereign in its own right and which at the 
same time, is not incorporated into the metropolitan area of the 
state on which it is dependent. In the context of British depen­
dencies, the most important legal characteristic is the ultimate 
12supremacy of the U.K. This concept is discussed further m  
section IV of tnis Chapter but for present purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that 'dependency' in U.K. terms connotes the 
unlimited capacity to legislate on the part of the ultimate 'parent 
state (as opposed to the intermediate 'parent' dependency'.)
III. Principles of the Constitutional Relationship
Periodically, studies have been conducted into the various 
aspects of the relationship between the U.K. and the island 
dependencies of the Crown. The most recent of these was the
13Royal Commission on the Constitution which reported in 1973 .
This exercise was conducted principally as a result of the upsurge
of nationalism in Scotland and Wales out the terms of reference
included a mandate to consider wnether any changes were desirable
in the relationship between the United Kingdom on the one hand and
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man on the other. The principle
of the relationship are contained in Chapter 31 of the Royal
14Commission's majority report but a more concise summary, repro­
duced in Appendix II, is to be found in an earlier study relating
specifically to the Isle of Man and conducted by a joint working
15party of the United Kingdom and Manx Governments .
Within these agreed principles, a certain ambiguity arises.
In the first place, the Crown has ultimate responsibility for the 
good government of the Islands and this is manifested in 



























































































supremacy . Notwithstanding this, the insular authorities
enjoy complete autonomy over matters which do not 'transcend'
17their own frontiers
Tnere is clearly a potential for conflict in these principles
and their ability to exist side oy side has been largely
dependent upon the restraint of the British Government.
Tne dicnotomy nas Deen highlignted, however, in recent times
as a result of the United Kingdom's acknowledged responsibility
1 8for the international relations of the Islands . The Royal 
Commission observed that:
"There is an increasing tendency for international
agreements to deal with matters hitherto regarded as
purely domestic and requiring domestic legislation for
19their implementation" .
Another feature they noted was the great difficulty being 
experienced in negotiating optional territorial application 
clauses for multi-lateral treaties. Without such a device, a 
treaty signatory is deemed to be signing on behalf of all 
territories for whose external relations it is responsible.
Thus, it has only recently become clear that the existing 
constitutional relationship embodies a principle which has 
the potential for eroding the autonomy of the Islands and the 
insular authorities are understandably concerned about the 
vulnerability of their independence to this development.
In addition to the agreed principles set out in Appendix II, 
there were certain disputed areas wnicn were raised by the
20Isle of Man in their evidence to the Stonham forking Party 
Of particular interest in this context was the disagreement 




























































































legislation by Parliament at 'Westminster, for the Isle of Man.
In addition, tnere were the related issues of the extension of 
U.K. statutes to tne Island when uniformity of legislation was 
considered desirable and the use of the Royal Prerogative in 
maxing Orders in Council for the Island.
In Section V of this Chapter, I propose to discuss in more 
detail, the legal nature of insular autonomy, oearing in mind the 
agreed and disputed principles discussed aoove.
The growth of international regulation, and the specific 
problems which have arisen in this area will be considered in 
Chapter 3.
IV. The Normal Functioning of the Relationship
It is important to bear in mind throughout this study that, 
notwithstanding the legal problems which have arisen, the 
relationship oetween the United Kingdom and the Islands is 
essentially a stable one. It is therefore, appropriate to devote 
some consideration to its ’normal' operation.
Firstly, in identifying the arenas which actually involve 
interaction Detween the Westminster and insular authorities, one 
can adopt two categories:
(i) Interaction at the administrative level and
(ii) Interaction involving legislation.
(i) In this area, it could be postulated that, since Britain 
is responsible for the good government of the Islands, it is 
entitled to monitor the administrative activity of the insular 
authorities, in order to ensure the maintenance of 'good government' 




























































































of this nature. The United Kingdom is clearly the dominant
'partner' in the constitutional system but overt supervision of
this kind would be provocative and largely unnecessary. With
established democratic institutions and politicians who are,
by necessity, closer to their electorate, good administrative
government, if one takes this to mean responsive, accessible
and open government is, in fact, more likely to be achieved
on the Islands, than in the U.K. itself.
With regard to the Isle of Man, the situation at the oegin-
ning of this century was very different. In addition to the
positive control exercised oy the U.K. Treasury over Manx
financial matters, it was said of the Home Office that:
"(its) rein...has been so tight...tnat neither a ream of
paper nor a bottle of ink can be purchased without the
21Home Office's permission"
As Kerncde has noted however, there has Deen a gradual loosening
of control and nowadays there are "few complaints aDout the way
P Pin which tne Home Office (performs) its duties"
Accordingly, at the administrative level, the relationship is
an informal one in which contacts are maintained Detween the
insular authorities and London, allowing public servants in the
former, access to their U.K. counterparts where necessary. The
larger British administration will clearly have a wider range
of expertise and the U.K., therefore, can play an advisory part,
giving guidance to the Islands. This is, .in fact, how the Home
Office has stated its role, as regards the Isle of Man. In
23their evidence to the Macdermott Commission , they saw their 
function as one of "seeking, so far as is practicable, to help 




























































































direct m a n a g e m e n t A n  analogous role may oe presumed in the 
case of the Channel Islands.
There are also a numoer of practical ways in which the Islands 
can receive help from the United Kingdom. In particular, officials 
may, from time to time, be seconded to tne Islands to render 
specialist assistance in a specific area. This has occurred 
recently in the fields of customs, Dancing supervision and 
oroadcasting.
(ii) The second area of interaction relates to legislation 
and this is clearly more formal in the sense that a set of 
procedures exists at the stage of enactment, Doth where insular 
legislation is suomitted to the Sovereign for Royal Assent and 
where tne intention is to extend U.K. legislation to the Islands. 
Looking firstly at insular legislation, the requirement for 
Royal Assent means that, in practice, the Home Office must approve 
all Bills emanating irom the Islands. This knowledge will clearly 
influence insular legislators in tneir assessment of the accept- 
aoility of a particular proposal. Prior consideration of Bills 
by the Home Office, oeiore their suDmission for Royal Assent 
also results from time to time in changes in the provisions and 
this informal procedure offers a means of circumventing open 
conflict in all out the most serious cases.
Where it is proposed to extend U.K. legislation to the Islands, 
Britain has committed itself to prior consultation, wherever 
possible. It would be an overstatement to describe this as a 
formal procedure since no specific mechanism has Deen set up 
to implement the commitment and occasionally, a U.K. law will be 
extended without consultation and this does not in any way undermine 




























































































is for consultation to take place between U.K. officials and 
insular politicians or civil servants.
In addition to the aoove two forms of interaction, two other 
elements in the relationship deserve brief mention. Firstly, the 
position of the Lieutenant-Governor on all tnree Islands may be 
regarded as the principal channel of communication oetween the 
Home Secretary and the insular autnorities. All information 
passing from United Kingdom Government Departments and 'vice 
versa' are sent via the respective Lieutenant-Governors. The 
weight of their advice in British Government circles is not easy 
to ascertain Dut, as Kermode has ooserved:
"...the combination of control of information and secrecy
surrounding tnis aspect of his work..." (i.e. as chief
communicator) "...suggests a role far removed from that of
25the Queen whom he represents" . y1' • '
Secondly, in the judicial sphere, the Appeal Courts of all three 
Islands, include judges who are memDers of the English Bar. Final 
appeal rests with tne Judicial Committee of trie Privy Council. 
Somewhat connected with this is tne fact that long-term prisoners 
are incarcerated in the U.K. by arrangement with the Home Office. 
Thus, there is clearly a worKing relationship established with 
regard to tne application and enforcement of law.
The overall picture is, however, one of suDstantial freedom 
in the Islands, for them to manage their own affairs accompanied 
by varying degrees of contact in which the United Kingdom 
frequently advises but only rarely imposes. It is a relationship 
which suits both parties; the islands oecause they have access to 




























































































(in particular the Home Office) Decause difficulties are kept 
to a minimum and they are able to devote their attention to 
wnat they perceive as more important issues.
V. The Nature of Insular Autonomy
The principles of the constitutional relationship, set out 
in Appendix II offer little guidance as to the exact legal 
nature of insular autonomy. Indeed, they might be said to 
ODscure the situation by estaDlishing tnat Doth the U.K. and the 
insular autnorities enjoy competence over certain fields in 
the sense that the Islands have complete internal autonomy 
wnile the United Kingdom nas ultimate legislative supremacy.
The situation can, pernaps, oest be clarified with reference 
to tnree specific topics which, it is suDmitted, point to tne 
legal dominance of tne U.K. These are (i) the question of a 
convention of non-interference, (ii) tne judicial protection of 
insular autonomy and (iii) the debate over the formal delimitation 
of powers.
(i) A Convention of Non-interference
In discussing the possioility that tne U.K. is governed by a 
convention of non-interference, with respect to domestic matters 
affecting the Islands, it is necessary to mention briefly, the 
nature of a convention under the British constitutional system.
0. Hood Phillips refers to conventions as "rules of political 
practice which are regarded as Dinding, by those whom they 
concern, especially the sovereign and statesmen, but which 





























































































Tnere can be little douot that conventions form the basis 
of the British Constitution and, given that they are unenforce­
able in courts of law, emphasis must be placed upon the binding 
element recognised Dy tne actors operating in the constitutional 
arena.
In essence, conventions, in order to De upheld, rely on self- 
regulatory activity or aostinence Dy tne interested actors. Two 
reasons may De postulated for the willingness of tne 'Sovereign 
and statesmen' to conform to conventions. Firstly, although 
there are no legal sanctions in the event of a breach, the 
potential political repercussions may, in fact, represent an 
equally potent sanction, inducing the actors to conform. The 
second consideration, which is arguably of equal importance, is 
respect for tne constitution itself and a recognition of the 
need to maintain its conventional basis in the absence of 
entrenched written rules.
In either case, it is submitted that, in order to justify the 
term 'convention', a rule must be recognised as Dinding upon 
those to whom it applies.
Moving to the specific topic under discussion, one sees that 
the extent to which Westminster is bound Dy convention not to 
interfere in the domestic affairs of the Islands is a matter of 
some dispute.
27During tne deliberations of the Stonham Working Party , the 
Manx representatives asserted that there was such a constitutional 
convention but tnis was not conceded by the British side and 
was subsequently recorded as an area of disagreement. This .was 
then reflected in tne first part of Tynwald's memorandum to the 




























































































poof joint evidence oy Tynwald and the Home Office .
It was in the evidence submitted by the States of Jersey 
to the Royal Commission, that the case in favour of a binding 
convention was argued most strongly. As a general principle,
Jersey conceded that:
"Tne United Kingdom Parliament retains ultimate legislative 
authority in all those parts of Her Majesty's Dominions 
over wnich it has not renounced its sovereignty"^.
With regard to self-governing territories outside the United 
Kingdom, however, the Jersey States came to the following 
conclusion.
"(P)arliamentary sovereignty is, to a very large extent, 
a legal aostraction, naving only a remote connection with 
political realities. Far more important than the theoretical 
omni-competence of Parliament, is the fact that sovereignty 
is qualified by a duty to oDserve constitutional conventions 
or binding usages"^0.
Tnere was no doubt in the minds of the Jersey representatives 
tnat Westminster would be acting unconstitutionally, should it 
decide to impose taxation, or some other 'domestic* legislation 
on the Island.
Guernsey also initially used the term 'constitutional convention'
31but they later accepted tneir autonomy as a 'de facto position'
which had been acknowledged by the British Government at their 
32request' .
The view of the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office was set out in tneir memorandum of evidence, in the 
following terms:




























































































for the good government of the Islands, it is essential 
for the United Kingdom to retain its residual power to 
legislate, if need De on matters 'that are domestic to 
the Islands""^.
After studying these conflicting views the Royal Commission 
came out in favour of the British Government, altnough somewhat 
ambiguously in that they repeatedly referred to the practice of 
non-interference as a convention. Despite this, the Commission
Delieved that "there were no circumstances in which (the British
\ , \ 3 4-Government) would be precluded from exercising (its) powers"
Thus, while the term ‘convention’ is accepted, the United
Kingdom does not appear to oe oound by it. By such a loose use of
terminology, the Royal Commission has arguably deDased a concept
which is fundamental to the British Constitution and have
rendered it, in practice, indistinguishaDle from the 'de facto
35position' suggested uy Guernsey .
It is submitted that, in fact, by insisting on its continued 
legal capacity to intervene, tne United Kingdom is explicitly 
denying the existence of a binding convention. All that exists, 
in effect, is a practice of non-interference to which the 
United Kingdom normally adheres^ in order to avoid political 
difficulties with the IslandSjbut which it is prepared to 
abandon where wider interests are at stake.
In the ensuing discussion, it may be noted that, despite this 
conclusion, the term 'convention' is used liberally to describe 
tne United Kingdom's practice of non-interference, even by 
those authorities which insist that the U.K. may ultimately 




























































































(11) Protection of Insular Autonomy by Petition to Her 
Majesty in Council
The opportunity to petition Her Majesty in Council, on 
any grievance, is one of the aspects of the constitutional 
relationship which is highly valued in the Islands, forming 
as it does, a practical example of the direct link histor­
ically maintained with the monarch.
In reality, this access to the Grown is something of a 
myth since a petition must be channelled through the Home 
Secretary who has the capacity to prevent it going any 
further. Furthermore, a petition which is deemed worthy of 
consideration by the Privy Council is heard, not by the 
Judicial Committee but by a Special Committee which is 
appointed in practice, oy the Government in London.
The procedure has, in fact been used to complain about
3bsome act or omission of the Island authorities , but I 
propose to assess here, the extent to which it can be viewed 
as a quasi-judicial mechanism for the protection of insular 
autonomy.
In the nineteenth century, several situations involving 
the States of Jersey could be invoked to support this 
hypotnesis . There were three cases in particular in which 
the Privy Council was called upon to consider the domestic 
competence of the Island vis a vis the Crown’s ultimate 
legislative supremacy and all of them involved the imposition 
of measures by Order in Council, without the consent of the 
States. It is significant that the arguments in these cases 



























































































Commission on the Constitution ' and, in each instance, 
the U,K. Government drew bacx from confrontation by 
removing the offending orders.
Developments in the twentieth century have tended, however, 
to undermine the 'judicial' character of the right of 
petition and it must now be regarded more in terms of a 
political procedure forthe airing of grievances.
The clearest evidence of this change is to be found in
the treatment of a petition from Tynwald in 1967. The
United Kingdom intended to extend to the Isle of Man, an
Act dealing with Marine Broadcasting offences, notwithstanding
Tynwald's opposition to it'' . The Manx therefore decided to
petition the Queen in Council and the request was duly
forwarded, via the Home Secretary, to the Privy Council.
The committee which dealt with it, however, was composed
Wentirely of ministers in the Westminster Government . Given 
that they represented one of the parties to the dispute, it 
would be difficult to ascribe any judicial character to the 
proceedings without manifestly exposing a breach of the 
principle 'nemo iudex in sua causa'. To the surprise of no- 
one, the petition in question was rejected.
In addition to the above mentioned change, there are two 
further developments which could lead one to assert that 
Jersey's successes in the nineteenth century have now been 
superceded.
The first is the already mentioned restatement of Westminster' 
overall power, contained in the Royal Commission's Report.
This may be no more legally authoritative than the 




























































































Committees but it has the advantage of being more recent.
The second item, which is more likely to have the status
4-1of a precedent, is a statement made in 1968, by Lord Reid, 
while giving judgement in a case before the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. This related to the internal 
competence of the Government in Southern Rhodesia and one 
must, therefore, Dear in mind the particular events surrounding 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence.
Lord Reid said:
"The learned judges" (i.e. of Southern Rhodesia) "refer
to the statement of the United Kingdom Government in
1 9 6 1 setting out the convention that the Parliament of
the United Kingdom does not legislate without the
consent of the Government of Southern Rhodesia on
matters within the competence of the Legislative Assembly.
That was a very important convention but it had no effect
4-2-in limiting the legal power of Parliament"
Lord Reid would also seem to favour a loose definition of 
the 'convention' concept but with regard to the supremacy 
question, he is unequivocal. So long as the United Kingdom 
retains ultimate authority in theory, it can ultimately use 
it in practice.
Given this situation, one might justifiably question the 
necessity, from a legal point of view, for an independent, 
judicial-type structure, to which the Islands could direct 
their grievances.
The Royal Commission nevertheless expressed some coneern 
at the absence of an objective petitions procedure and 
recommended a new system "whereby petitions could be



























































































referred to a body which included some independent members
Tnis new body, it was suggested, could be called 'the Council
for the Islands' and it "would combine the function of
conciliation witn that of giving advice to the Committee of
44the Privy Council on petitions from the Islands"
In political terms, such a Council mignt prove to be 
valuable as a forum for discussion but it would clearly do 
nothing to strengthen the tenuous legal foundation on which 
insular autonomy is so evidently based. To date, the recommend­
ation has not been implemented.
(Ul) Definition of Domestic Competence and the Debate over a 
Formal Delimitation of Powers.
Given the existence of a policy of non-interference in 
the domestic sphere, a question which is of significance is 
the exact scope of the Islands' domestic powers. At the outset 
it should be stressed that these are very considerable at 
present and, given the harmonious relationship between London 
and the insular authorities, there is no immediate prospect 
of a substantial erosion.
There has been pressure in the recent past, however, for 
a clarification of the respective powers of the Islands and 
of the United Kingdom.
45-In their suomissions to the Stonham Working Party and
4bthe Royal Commission , the Manx and Jersey authorities 
proposed that Westminster legislation be enacted, setting 




























































































This was done with an eye to the encroachment of inter­
national law obligations as well as to the possibility of 
the United Kingdom acting in defence of its own interests 
and eroding the Islands' autonomy in the process.
The proposals put forward , highlighted the problems of 
finding agreement over a strict demarcation of competences. 
Jersey gave the assurance that all it wished was:
"...to have aspects of the Island's relationship,hitherto
regulated by constitutional convention and usage,
4-8asserted, crystallised and fortified"
Yet the Island then went on to suggest that Parliament could 
somehow preclude itself from altering or repealing the 
proposed Act, without the consent of the States of Jersey . 
This is obviously inconsistent with the ultimate capacity 
of Westminster to intervene and, as has oeen shown, there 
is no inclination in London to abandon this principle.
Tynwald was less confident in its repres&atations, acknowl­
edging the existing douot which surrounded the respective 
powers of the Isle of Kan and the United Kingdom. They then 
proceeded to recommend legislation which would have given
the Island a status, similar to that of the Associated States
50of the Cariooean , something which was equally unrealistic 
in the light of the British stance.
Thus, it was clear from the outset that the more radical 
aspects of the proposals would be unacceptable to the UK 
Government. In their response, they stated two overriding 
reasons for their opposition to a formal division of powers. 




























































































be to "leave Her Majesty's Government... responsibility...
51without power" . In certain circumstances, they envisaged 
the United Kingdom lacking the legislative authority to 
ensure the implementation of international law obligations 
while continuing in law to be responsible for the Islands' 
external relations.
Tneir second objection was that there would be 'awesome' 
practical difficulties in distinguishing areas of respons­
ibility with 'any degree of precision''. Once again, they 
pointed to the international field with its 'continually
shifting frontier' between domestic and international
. . 52 matters
With regard to this second point, a question which arises 
is why it snould be more difficult to formalise and clarify 
the Islands', autonomy than to undertake afresh, the 
devolution of substantial powers to a particular region of 
the United Kingdom. The Kilbrandon Report rejected the 
former solution for the Islands while recommending the 
latter for Scotland and Wales.
It was also put to the Commission that a precedent existed
in the form of countries which had federal constitutions,
without intolerable pressures arising out of international
obligations. The Commission sought to distinguish the two
situations, however, by reference to the range of independent
powers enjoyed by the 'devolved' unit and came to the
conclusion that, Decause the Islands had significantly
greater powers than the average federal entity, the risk of
conflict was potentially greater, in the event of a legislative




























































































On the face of it, this argumentation displays a curious 
attitude to the utility of legal mechanisms for regularising 
de facto autonomy. In reality, however, the Commission is 
merely reflecting the fact that entrenched legislation is 
alien to the British Constitutional system. In effect, it 
was inconceivable that Westminster could enact a measure 
purporting to bind future Parliaments, so long as the 
Crown remained responsible for the good government of the 
Islands.
Another important objection to the Manx and Jersey proposal,
which was recognised by the Royal Commission, was that
it would introduce an element of rigidity into the Islands’
54-relations with the United Kingdom . This was the view of
the States of Guernsey who indicated in their evidence, their
preference for the existing ’flexible' system of unwritten 
55-principles . As the Kilbrandon Report noted:
"The loss of this flexibility, and the replacement of
a largely informal relationship by a more formal one
would, we think, to be worthwhile, have to bring some
5bvery solid advantages to the Islands"
In the event, they deemed the advantages insufficient and, 
bearing in mind the lack of insular unanimity, they had little 
difficulty in recommending the status quo.
It is of interest to speculate whetner some lesser 
legislative measure might not have been possible. Removing 
the more radical aspects of the Islands' proposals, there 
remains the fundamental proposition that insular powers 




























































































have included a provision establishing the primacy of the 
U.K. Government together with a clause allowing the latter 
to derogate from the agreed division of responsibilities 
in pursuit of international obligations. It would thus have 
avoided the problem of 'responsibility without power' 
invoked by the United Kingdom and, although falling short 
of the Islands' aspirations, would have offered two useful 
guarantees.
Firstly, a written statement, enjoying the status of &a 
Act of Parliament, and setting out the areas of insular 
competence, would offer some protection from a political 
point of view.
Secondly, a procedure would be established to ensure
proper consultation, in the event of a derogation being
required. One of the potential concerns of the Islands
relates, not so much to the action of the British Government
(although this is clearly important), but to their possible
failure to engage in discussions prior to a decision being 
5>taken . This system could accordingly have benefitted both 
sides by reducing the likelihood of confrontation.
The 'awesome' practical difficulties which were 
envisaged would also be alleviated by the U.K.'s express 
detention of its residual authority since the consequences 
of any particular division of powers would not be so 
serious for the U.K. Government.
In any event, one might be justified in concluding that 
the more 'awesome' the practical difficulties are, the more 
important it is to resolve them. The British Government 



























































































The one argument which continues to hold good relates to 
the loss of flexibility in the existing relationship and 
it is this factor which might cast some douot on the 
willingness of Jersey and the Isle of Man to see a lesser 
measure enacted.
At present, the undefined nature of the Islands* powers 
allows tnem to legislate in any field, so long as they do 
not incur the displeasure of the Westminster Government.
This allows them to be responsive to changing circumstances 
and to intervene in new areas wnere appropriate. A strict 
delimitation of powers would curtail this ability and, in 
the aDsence of entrenched rights of enactment over certain 
agreed sectors, this could effectively result in a diminution 
of insular power.
It is probable that the loss of flexibility would only 
have been acceptable (to Jersey and the Isle of Man) if 
it had been accompanied by a guarantee that the agreed com­
petences were inviolable and, as has been outlined above, the 
United Kingdom was unable to maice such a commitment.
In tne absence of any definitive document setting out the 
powers of the insular authorities, the conclusion is that, 
Strictly speaxing, all legislative authority rests with the 
Crown and therefore, by extension, with the United Kingdom 
G overn m ent.
As a matter of long-standing practice, the Islands may make 
rules on any matters which do not transcend their own frontiers 
and somewhere within the scope of interpretation of this





























































































VI. The Factors which led to the Present Informal Structure of
Autonomy
The attitudes adopted Dy the British Government, which are 
described in the previous pages, give rise to a fundamental 
question. Why does the United Kingdom, on the one hand, tolerate 
the existence of quasi-independent entities which are constitution­
ally within their control, while on the other hand, refuse to 
formalise the relationship which has evolved, either by means of 
recognising that binding conventions exist, or by setting out 
the principles in statutory form and thereby facilitating legal 
certainty.
For an answer to this question one must look:
(i) to certain distinctive features which set the Islands apart 
Doth from the British overseas territories which they resemble in 
several respects and from mainland Britain into which they so 
easily could have been incorporated and
(ii) to the British constitutional doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy.
Loosing firstly at the U.K.'s unwillingness to formalise the 
relationship, it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of 
geographical proximity. As part of the British Isles, they are 
liaole to impinge more directly on the U.K.'s interests than its 
other territories. For instance, the tax policies pursued in the 
Islands are likely to have a greater impact on the behaviour of 
British investors than the policies adopted oy Caribbean isalnds 
which are more distant and less stable politically.
The status of the Islands will also have an effect on the extent
of the British continental shelf. If they were to become 



























































































area over which the U.K. could exercise sovereignty. By keeping 
tne relationship informal, Britain may be seen to be preempting 
any moves towards independence in the sense that it has allowed 
consideraDle de facto autonomy, without naving reduced the scope 
of its legal powers.
For strategic reasons, Britain is also bound to have an interest
in tne government of the Islands. They are sufficiently close to
the British mainland for tne U.K. to have an interest in the nature
of the regime established and while hostile insular governments
represent an unlikely scenario, the unfettered ability to take
59action in defence of the realm is obviously useful .
Tnere is also an understandable desire to avoid taking any
measures wnich might De interpreted as a renunciation of overall
authority. As is discussed later, tne United Nations Special
Committee whicn considers the progress of colonial entities
towards self-determination is assiduous in the pursuit of its 
6 0objectives and any action by Britain which might be construed 
(or misconstrued) as a loosening of ties, could lead to inter­
national pressure aimed at ending a newly-discovered 'colonial 
situation'.
Secondly, the relationship is characterised, in any event, by 
closer cultural linKs than is the case with most other remaining 
dependencies and tnis is reflected in the desire wnich exists 
on both sides, for the maintenance of special relations. This 
is manifested in a reluctance to treat the Islands in the same 
manner as overseas territories.
Thirdly, Britain will always want to maintain its ability to 
intervene, not necessarily Decause they expect to have to do so^, 




























































































too strongly from the chosen policy route of their metropolitan
neighbour. The insular authorities are highly conscious of the
need to maintain a low profile and, in many instances, that is
6 Ptest achieved by following the policies adopted in Britain .
Tax is a notable exception out, for various reasons, this is
not entirely the thorn in the U.K.'s flesh which it might appear .
Perhaps the most important reason for the U.K.'s unwillingness 
to formalise the relationship is to be found in the central 
principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty under the British Const­
itution. As Sir Edward Coke has oDserved:
"The power and jurisdiction of Parliament is so transcendant 
and aosolute, tnat it cannot be confined, either for causes
6 4or persons, witnin any bounds"
De Smith elaborates tne principle in the following terms:
"The Queen in Parliament is competent, according to United
Kingdom law to make or unmake any law whatsoever; and no
United Kingdom court is competent to question the validity
of an Act of Parliament. Every other law-making Dody within
tne realm either derives its authority from Parliament, or
exercises it at the sufferance of Parliament; it cannot be
superior to or even coordinate with, Dut must be subordinate 
65to Parliament" .
Although talking in a United Kingdom context, there can oe little 
douot, from the foregoing discussion, that the concept of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty applies, oy extension, to the Islands 
under discussion and, to use de Smith's terminology, the insular 
governments exercise their authority 'at the sufferance of 
Parliament'.




























































































one sees that Parliamentary sovereignty would be undermined by a 
formalisation of the relationship. Clearly, a binding rule of 
non-interference imposes limitations upon the scope of Parliamentar 
activity. Similarly, a formal procedure for judicial review of 
governmental activity would result in the estaolishment of a form 
of constitutional court, capaole of overruling Parliamentary 
decisions. The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty does not 
allow for the operation of such a higher judicial body and indeed, 
the concept would oe anathema to British legislators.
With regard to the formal division of competences, it has 
already been noted that this could De achieved without constituting 
a legal attack on Parliamentary sovereignty. A political oojection 
can, however, De raised. In conferring specific powers upon the 
Islands oy legislation, tne U.K would be creating obstacles to 
its future actions since the political consequences of encroach­
ment, even wnere the possioility is envisaged Dy the express 
retention of residual power, may lead to noth domestic and 
international repercussions.
On achieving a legislative division of competences, the Islands 
would naturally come to regard the Act concerned as a form of 
'constitution' and suosequent interference would probably provoke 
insular hostility.
A related feature of the constitution which is relevant here, 
is its unitary nature. The concept of federalism will be 
discussed later out it may be noted for present purposes that 
tne Islands presently have a consideraole measure of capacity 
for independent action and, were this to be formalised, it 
would arguaoly undermine the unitary nature of the British 





























































































The question wnich now arises is the historical rationale for 
Britain's failure to incorporate the Islands into the United 
Kingdom. The following reasons may, perhaps oe postulated.
Firstly,whereas other self-governing dependencies derive 
their powers exclusively from Westminster legislation, the 
existence of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands as autonomous 
units predates not only the intervention of the U.K. out also 
the emergence af its component countries^, as cohesive political 
entities.
A second factor, from a historical perspective is, paradoxically 
enough, the geographical remoteness of trie Islands from the 
centre of power. Taken in conjunction with the separate evolution 
of local institutions, a factor wnich distinguishes tnem from 
the Western and Northern Isles of Scotland, tne effect was a 
certain immunity from tne centralising forces which accompanied 
the emergence of a constitutional monarchy in Britain. One 
might speculate, in this connection, whether the preservation 
of separate institutions in noth the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man reveals a more 'laissez-faire' philosophy in England 
than in Scotland, prior to the Union of' 1707. Orkney, Shetland 
and the Western Isles all lost their Norse institutions under 
Scottish rule.
With particular regard to the Channel Islands, one must take 
into account their strategic position as 'British' territories 
lying in the Channel in the embrace of France. It was useful 
to Westminster to have an outpost situated 'on the doorstep' 
of their traditional enemy and English kings therefore treated 





























































































Finally, the importance of tradition in the United Kingdom 
should not De underestimated. Insular autonomy may never have 
oeen fully legitimised out it is now so thoroughly institution­
alised that an Act of Incorporation is inconceivable.
The conclusion must be that the present relationsnip 
Detween Westminster and the Islands is characterised by a 
dicnotomy oetween tne legal norms and the situation in 
reality.
Tne central doctrine, is that of the supremacy of Parl­
iament and this extends to the Islands by virtue of the 
Crown’s responsibility for tneir good government. The main 
facets of the relationship, however, are oased on extra-legal 
factors : long-standing traditions, historical autonomy, and 
a form of political equilibrium which has been arrived at 
without recourse to legal devices.
This last element, which is developed further in the 
following section of this chapter, is vital to the stability 
of the Islands.
In modern times, however, a number of external factors 
threaten to disrupt this equilibrium. International 
obligations have created for tne United Kingdom, higher 
political priorities and tne Islands are, accordingly, 
threatened Dy a gradual limitation of their capacity for 
independent action. How both sides have, responded to this 




























































































VII. Characterisation of the Islands' Constitutional Status
As a conclusion to this discussion, one might return to the 
question of the Islands' constitutional status and, in particular, 
whether it is possible to characterise it in terms of any 
generally accepted category.
National constitutional systems abound with different types of 
entity ranging from local government units with only limited 
administrative functions to federal divisions capable of exercising 
substantial legislative and executive responsibilities independent 
of the federal government.
Several states have colonial possessions with varying degrees 
of internal self-government and so long as colonialism exists, 
it must De regarded as a form of constitutional category, although 
falling outside the continuum which could be constructed for 
units within a metropolitan territory.
Terminology poses a problem in that many of the terms used 
cover a variety of internal constitutional arrangements. For 
instance, 'local-government', 'federalism' and 'internal self- 
government' all encompass within their definitions, a broad 
range of governmental schemes, and such is the diversity that 
no one in particular can be held to constitute the norm. The 
terms, nevertheless, serve to offer a conceptual framework and by 
establishing the existence of certain general characteristics, 
it is usually possible to assign entities to one or other of the 
categories.
In this discussion, I propose to:
(i) Establish the general characteristics of the relationship 





























































































(ii) Examine the tnree constitutional forms which are usually 
adopted as reflecting the general characterisation with a view 
to assessing which is the most appropriate for the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man.
(i) As a first step, a general statement may be made to the effect 
that the U.K./insular relationship is one between identifiable 
political and geographical entities of unequal size which, 
intending to maintain a constitutional link, have arrived at a 
situation which preserves the link while allowing legal diversity. 
The more specific characteristics may be enumerated as follows:
(a) The existence of a central government committed to retaining 
a constitutional relationship with the territory under 
consideration.
(b) The existence of a territory, smaller than the nation to 
which it is legally bound but with particular features 
which, individually, or in combination, justify a form of 
special treatment. These features may include:
- a national or cultural deviation from the metropolitan 
centre
- geographical distance from the metropolitan centre
- a political will to establish or continue legal links 
with the centre
- financial dependence upon the metropolitan country
- some other form of dependence upon the metropolitan country 
(e.g. for defence purposes)
(c) The tendency for a political equilibrium to be established
somewhere between the extremes of unitary incorporation 



























































































political equilibrium is fundamental to the discussion and 
is perhaps, best explained by reference to situations in which 
no equilibrium has been established.
At the •unitary1 end of the scale, one may give the example 
of the United Kingdom and Scotland. Here, it may be asserted 
that, due to a combination of strong centralist tendencies in 
London and an insufficient regional pressure to provide the 
necessary catalyst for a transfer of powers, one cannot talk 
in terms of 'equilibrium1. Accordingly, Westminster continues 
to exercise a legislative monopoly. Wales and Corsica (until 
recently) may be cited as similar cases.
At the other extreme, there is the case of the United 
Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Here, the force of 
Irish nationalism, in conjunction with an absence of political 
will in London to retain some form of constitutional control, 
resulted in the establishment of a new state enjoying complete 
legislative sovereignty.
One could say that political equilibrium is achieved when 
the relationship between the entities involves an actual 
division of powers, whether or not this is reflected in the 
legal forms. The concept may, therefore, encompass a wide range 
of existing constitutional relationships between central 
governments and identifiable sub-sections of their territory.
(ii) Following this characterisation, I propose to discuss the 
three terms which may be regarded as the basic models available 
under the above defined set of political and social circumstances. 





























































































(a) Internal self-government, which is not strictly speaking 
a legal term, may nevertheless be defined broadly as an 
arrangement whereoy the central government delegates legislative 
and executive functions to a region within the country. The 
powers exercisaDle by the regional authority are derived from 
and susceptiDle to the central government and the latter may, 
without constitutional limitation, alter or abolish those powers. 
The region is considered part of the metropolitan area of the 
country and retains direct representation at the centre.
The term has been chosen in preference to ’devolution’ despite 
the fact that the latter expression has been most commonly adopted 
in the U.K. in the recent consideration of schemes which fall 
within the above definition. The reason for this is that it is, 
in fact, erroneous to employ ’devolution1 is such a restrictive 
way. Bogdanor states that "devolution... involves constitutional
6 7change of a wide ranging and fundamental kind" . In the specific
context of the U.K. debate of the late 1970s, this may have oeen
the case but devolution may actually occur when any person or
body passes power or authority to another^®. The conferral of
independence upon a former colony is devolution. So too is the
granting of authority to local councils to pass bye-laws. Thus,
69although Bogdanor, Dalyell and other writers may be justilied 
in using tne term according to its acquired meaning in the 
British political system, in their studies of a specific U.K.
phenomenon, tne concept of 'internal self-government' is preferred
70m  this study as being legally more exact
One of the clearest examples of internal self-government as 
it is defined above, is that of the old Stormont Government in 




























































































powers exercised by this body prior to the reimposition of direct 
rule from Westminster. What is significant is the very fact that 
the London Government was legally able to take this step and 
thereby to illustrate in the most graphic way possible, that the 
initial transfer of powers did not limit the ultimate power of 
the metropolitan centre.
(b) The second category of constitutional arrangement which
reflects the general characteristics * set out above is 'federalism'.
In attempting to define this term in the light of the different
federal structures which exist in the modern world, authors have
sought to identify common elements or arrive at generally applicable
statements. For instance, it has been suggested tnat federalism
71represents "a political philosophy of diversity in unity'' . 
Similarly, Neumann » in identifying the common cnaracteristic of 
various types of federal entity, states that:
"...in each, the citizen of the federal state is subject
to two jurisdictions - that of the federal government and
72tnat of the states"
Clearly, neither of tnese statements is exclusive to those 
governmental structures which purport to be federations. Other 
forms, including the previously discussed concept of 'internal 
self-government' display characteristics of diversity in unity 
and involve dual jurisdiction. As Preston King pointed out: 
"Federations are not the only states which reconcile some 
local autonomy with some central direction" 
or put more strongly:
"...all states, including federations, marry some local




























































































Federalism, therefore, requires to be more clearly defined and
King suggested a more specific concept when he wrote:
"Basically, we propose that federation De regarded as an
institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign
state and distinguished from other such states solely by
the fact that its central government incorporates regional
units into its decision procedure on some constitutionally
74entrenched oasis" .
Tne rationale for the estaolishment of a federal structure
75is often explained by reference to contract theory . It has been 
descrioed in terms of a contract or compromise oetween two 
political systems or, as Hicks puts it:
"...a type of polity, operating a constitution which wortcs
on two levels of government: as a nation and as a collection
76of related Dut self-standing units"
In assessing tne suitability of contract theory, it is necessary 
to draw a distinction between the foundation of tne system and 
the motives wnich permit its continued existence.
Whether tnere is a contractual foundation depends to a large 
extent on the nature of tne pre-existing governmental system.
Where a group of states agrees to come together under a federation, 
the agreement will normally oe founded upon a treaty and this is 
in some ways, analogous to a contract. Where, on the other hand, 
a centralised state decides to adopt a federal structure, by 
dividing its territory into 'sub-states' or provinces, there is 
essentially a unilateral act. Whether there is also a 'contractual'
element depends, not only upon the participation of authorities or
77individuals representing the sub-states , but upon -their ability 




























































































to talk in terms of a 'contract* where the central government, 
after consultation with interested parties, chooses to adopt a 
federal system and, tnereoy to divest itself of certain 
competences, wnere the decision is arrived at, not in response 
to pressure from oelow but simply in the pursuit of a policy
of decentralisation for tne purposes of administrative efficiency.
78There may also oe federation imposed hy force and such an 
action clearly exhibits very few contractual characteristics.
It is suDmitted, therefore, that it is not possible to talk of 
contract at tne a priori stage, as a general rule in the 
estaclisnment of federations. Indeed, it is doubtful whether one 
is justified in importing tnis private law concept into the 
arena of puolic law.
Once a federation exists, however, it may oe postulated that 
its continuation is founded upon 'contract* in tne sense of a 
contract of government. In other words, the continuing relation- 
snip oetween federal governments and the individual states is 
caned, as Preston King says on the "voluntary mutual exchange of 
a measure of independence against some matching and mutual
70advantage"
It is not proposed, in tnis paper, to enter into the complexities 
of tne estate as to the nature of federalism. From this brief 
discussion, however, two central aspects of the system may be 
asserted.
Firstly, tnere must exist an element of agreement between two 
:.olitical systems, to divide tne powers available to them and 
accordingly, to abstain from exercising the authority which is 
acknowledged as within tne domain of the other. Secondly, there 




























































































ese reasons, tne federalism option is untenable, 
st comfortaole definition for the Channel Islands and 
of Man is that tney are ’quasi-colonies'. They fulfil 
criterion in that they are not treated under the 
onstitution as part of the metropolitan territory, 
er of other factors may ue cited to support this view, 
rst place, they enjoy no democratic representation at 
•e, despite the legislative authority exercised by 
•er. The same is also true for Britain's remaining over- 
mdencies. Secondly, they display a number of similarities 
otner, more generally recognised 'colonial' possessions. 
)le, trie position of the Lieutenant-Governors, as has 
3d, involves more than the mere formal representation 
jnarch. Indeed, until recently, the Lieutenant-Governor, 
arly in tne Isle of Man, was an official with consideraDle 
ent authority, altnough this has oeen subject to gradual 
over tne years. In addition, the existence of the Judicial 
e of the Privy Council as tne final court of appeal may 
as a 'colonial' feature. The Judicial Committee has no 
tion over cases arising in the United Kingdom whereas it 
tionally the court of last instance for proceedings 
,ing in Britain's colonies (and in ex-colonies wnich have 
.ished the procedure).
rriving at the conclusion that the relationship is a 
jlonial one, one must acknowledge the difficulty that 
the United Kingdom, nor tne Islands would favour such a 
ion, in view of its emotive connotations. Nevertheless, 
stitutional purposes, it is suomitted that this character- 
is, legally, the most appropriate.
50
constitutional system and therefore, oy definition, the establish­
ment of a distinction between 'ordinary' laws and laws which change 
the balance of powers previously arrived at, tne latter being 
subject to an extraordinary procedure.
In practical terms, this implies a written constitution of 
80some form and an independent procedure for settling disputes 
Detween the two autnorities.
Finally, it should De noted that wnere an entity is in a 
federal relationship with a central government, the territory of 
the former is treated as part of the metropolitan territory of 
the whole.
(c) The third legal form to De discussed is the colonial situation. 
D.K. Fieldhouse has written that:
"Colonialism...now means tne condition of a subject people 
and is used exclusively of non-European societies, when
Q -junder the control of a European State or the U.S.A." .
If one were to accept this definition, then the Islands under 
discussion would clearly be excluded. It is necessary, however, 
to draw a distinction Detween tne meaning of the term as it is 
used in the international sphere and what might, more suitably 
De described as the‘quasi-colonialism’ which characterises certain 
internal constitutional structures. The former is clearly 
subject to distortion by international political influences.
For legal purposes, however, I would define the latter as a 
relationship between a nation state and a territory, in which 
the former exercises legal sovereignty over the latter without 
recognising it, in law, as part of its metropolitan area. In 




























































































is treated separately from the metropolitan state.
The legal consequences of this are variable. If, however, the 
territory has no democratic representation at the centre or if 
its citizens do not en^oy equal citizenship rignts with those 
in the 'parent' country, a colonial cnaracterisation may De more 
easily estaolished.
Tne question which must now oe considered is which category 
most accurately reflects the situation of the Cnannel Islands 
ana tne Isle of Man.
It is possiDle, Dy analogy, to equate certain aspects of 
the relationship with the concept of internal self-government. 
Westminster may aloer or aDolish insular competences and, in 
tne case of tne Isle of Man, the U.K. has also oeen responsible 
for tne granting of powers over a period of two centuries.
Given tne pre-existing autonomy, however, it would De stretching 
the point to talK of delegation. In any event, the Islands are 
not constitutionally part of the United Kingdom, nor do they 
have any representation in London.
Looking at federalism, it may be assumed that the relationship 
is founded upon an agreement or 'voluntary mutual exchange'
Detween tne Westminster and insular authorities. There is also 
considerable restraint exercised oy the metropolitan government 
in tne sense tnat they avoid intervening in matters recognised 
as falling within insular competence.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom does not recognise any 
oinding constitutional conventions, limiting its own capacity to 
legislate for the Islands. As has been noted, they periodically 
emphasise their unrestricted right to intervene and, by definition, 
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A more difficult proDlem relates to the dichotomy which 
sometimes exists Detween this definition and the international 
perception of a territory. This divergence is particularly 
relevant to the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands and is 
considered in Chapter 4.
Chapter 2 - Footnotes
1. For instance, the procedure for petitioning Her Majesty in 
Council allows individual Islanders to voice grievances 
which are, in practice, considered by the British Government
2. The Report of the Joint Wording Party on the Constitutional 
Relationship between the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom, 
(The Stonham Report), HMSO London, 1969 and:
The Report of tne Royal Commission on the Constitution (The 
Kilbrandon Report) Cmnd 5460.
3. See Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, Vol.l, 
Ch.31, p.408, para.1347
4. This was stated several times by different insular officials 
during interviews conducted in the Islands, January and April, 
1983.
5. In practice, it is the Home Secretary, as Minister of the 
Department responsible lor dealings with the Islands.
6. This occurred in 1962, when the Royal Assent was withheld from 
the Wireless Telegraphy (Isle of Man) Act, See Ch.3.
7. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 'dependency' as "a 
dependent or subordinate place or territory - especially a 
country or province subject to the control of another of which 




























































































8. See Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th ed. pp.129-130. pp.133-137
9. See Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law,
4th ed. pp.250-255
10. See Brierly, supra, pp.173-181
11. ioid p.134
See also Grieg, International Law, 2nd ed. pp.102-103
12. This is cased upon tne supreme autnority of Parliament. Since 
it is constitutionally impossible to fetter Parliament in any 
way it has, oy extension, the ultimate sovereignty over non- 
metropolitan territories for which it is responsible. See 
Harvey and Bather, The British Constitution, 2nd ed. at p.7 
et seq. on Parliamentary Sovereignty.
13. See footnote 2 supra - Kilurandon Report
14. Cmnd 5460 Vol.l
15. See footnote 2 supra - Stonham Report
It. ioid p.3 principles (i) and (ii)
17. ioid principle (iv)
18. ioid principle (iii)(b)
19. op cit p.413, para. 1374
20. See Stonham Report pp.3-4
21. See D.G. Kermode, Devolution at Work - A Case Study of the Isle 
of Man, p.106
22. ibid
23. MacDermott Report (Report of the Commission on the Isle of Man 
Constitution, 14th March, 1959)
24. ibid Vol. II p.138
25. Kermode, supra p.107





























































































27. Stonham Report p.3





32. On the 23th October, 1967, Guernsey States passed a resolution 
requesting the Secretary of State to assure them that there 
was "no question of Her Majesty's Government seeking to 
legislate for the Island in any taxation matter which has 
long been accepted as the responsibility and concern of the 
insular authorities". Such an assurance was forthcoming from 
the Minister of State, Lord Stonham, at a meeting with a 
States' delegation on the 26th July, 1968.
33. Vol.6, Minutes of Evidence, p.10
34. Report of the Royal Commission Vol.l, p.445, para.1472
35. No Footnote
36. In 'Re the States, of Jersey', it was a petition from a group 
of Islanders, who had formed a de facto police committee, 
which resulted in tne original Order in Council to which
the States objected in their own petition.
37. Re the States of Jersey (1853) 9 Moo. P.C.C. 187, the 
Victoria College Question and the Jersey Prison Board Case - 
see Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee of 
the States of Jersey appointed to consult with Her Majesty's 
Government in the United Kingdom on all Matters relating to 
the Government's application to join the European Economic 
Community. (The Jersey Report), Island of Jersey, 1967, pp. 30-34.




























































































Prison Board Case, p.33 of the Jersey Report
39. The United Kingdom Marine (etc) Broadcasting Offences Act, 
1967. (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed consideration)
40. See D.G. Kermode, Devolution at Work : A Case Study of the 
Isle of Man, p.105
41. Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke 1969» 1. A.C. 645
42. ibid p.722-3
43. Report of the Royal Commission, Vol.l, p.466, para.1539
44. ibid
45. Stonham Report, para.39
46. Minutes of Evidence, Voi.6, p.31 (Isle of Man), p.107 
(Jersey)
47. ibid p.107, 1(b) of proposed changes
48. ibid
49. ibid 1(c) of proposed changes
50. The Associated States of the Caribbean were given full 
internal self-government with the United Kingdom retaining 
responsibility for defence and foreign affairs. In practice, 
they were able to engage in limited international activities. 
For instance, they had "the authority to apply for full or 
associate membersnip...in U.N. specialised agencies or 
similar international organisations of wnich the United 
Kingdom is itself a member and for membership of which the 
territory is eligible" (U.N. Doc. A/AC 109/L. 362, 10th 
Feoruary, 1967, pp.13,14 - Draft dispatch by the United 
Kingdom)





























































































53. See Kermode, supra at p.108 for a description of the problems 
which arose in the nineteenth century, due to the failure
to consult Tynwald over legislation applied to the Isle of 
Man.
54. Vol.l, Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution, 
p.450, para.1489
55. Vol.6, Minutes of Evidence, p.230
56. See supra, footnote 54
57. See Kermode, supra, at p.110 on the preference in the Isle 
of Man for Tynwald legislation, even where the situation is 
effectively one of 'legislate or be legislated for'. Clearly, 
some form of prior consultation is necessary to allow this 
course of action.
58. This phrase was originally coined by the Home Secretary,
R.A. Butler, in 1957. See 577 H.C. Deoates, 27 Nov. 1957,
Col.1185
59. In 1939, the U.K. made use of this ability, in assuming 
control over a wide range of functions in the Isle of Man, 
due to the war situation.
60. The U.N. General AssemDly Special Committee on the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (U.N.
General Assembly Resolution 1514)
61. In practice, British intervention is very rare although the 
extent of it may be concealed by a priori discussions
in which the insular autnorities choose to enact a particular 
measure as insular legislation rather than leaving it to 




























































































62. During interviews with Government officers in the Isle of 
Man (January 1983) and the Channel Islands (April 1983) 
it was repeatedly stressed that the insular authorities 
modelled most of their legislation, other than in the 
financial field, on the equivalent British law.
63. For instance, funds accumulated in the Islands remain 
within the Sterling Are instead of being depositediin more 
distant tax havens. The Islands also contribute to the U.K.'s 
foreign currency reserves.
64. See Harvey and Bather, the British Constitution, 2nd ed. 
pp.7,8, quoting from Blackstone's Commentaries.
65. S.A . de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law,
2nd ed. p.65
66. For historical accounts of the Islands' development, see: 
History of the Channel Islands (to 1979) toy Raoul Lempriere 
and The Isle of Man, A Social, Cultural and Political History 
toy R.H. Kinvig.
67. Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution, Oxford University Press 1979, p.l
68. The Oxford English Dictionary definition is "The passing of 
power or authority of one person or body to another".
69. Tam Dalyell, Devolution, The End of Britian?, Jonathan Cape, 
1977.
70. The term may, nevertheless, encompass varying degrees of 
regional autonomy granted toy a central government.
71. Preston King, Federalism and Federation, Croom Helm, London
1982, p.20
72. From 'Federalism, Mature and Emergent' ed. toy Arthur W. 
MacMahon. Chapter 3, 'Federalism and Freedom : A Critique' 




























































































73. King supra p.77
74. ibid
75. e.g. King supra, at pp.56-58,78-79 discusses authors who 
seek to explain federalism by reference to contract theory.
76. Ursula Hicks, Federalism 'Failure and Success' - A Comparative 
Study. London, Macmillan, 1978, p.4
77. This is clearly more likely where the proposed states of 
a federation reflect existing cultural or geographical 
communities, or administrative sub-divisions.
78. e.g. The Soviet acquisition of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
or the forcible reunification of the United States of America 
following the secession of the Southern states.
79. King supra, p.41. The author is setting out his interpretation 
of Proudhon's philosophy.
80. See p.49 infra on the possibility of an unwritten constitution 
in a federal system.
81. D.K. Fieldhouse, Colonialism 1870-1945, p.6
82. See Carl J. Friedrich in 'Federalism and Supreme Courts and 
the Integration of Legal Systems', ed. E. McWhinney, P. 




























































































Chapter 3 - International Law and the Islands
I. The Erosion of Domestic Autonomy in the light of the 
Growth of International Regulation and the problems 
which arise out of the United Kingdom's Exclusive 
Treaty-making Power.
(i) Introduction
It is proposed in this section, to consider in more detail, 
the specific problems arising out of the growth of inter­
national regulation. In particular, three specific cases 
will be considered which have, in recent times, threatened 
to d rupt the equilibrium of the U.K./insular relationship.
As an introduction, however, it is useful to summarise 
the general circumstances which have brought about the problem.
Since the end of the Second World War, international 
treaty law has expanded rapidly and the list of subjects 
regulated internationally has also grown at a considerable 
pace. The effect of many of these treaty obligations has 
been to limit the scope of action available to sovereign 
states at the domestic level by imposing upon them the 
requirement, either to legislate in a particular fashion, 
or to abstain from actions which are in breach of international 
commitments.
What is the effect of this development on the notion of 
sovereignty?. As Grieg points out:
"The transfer of the concept of sovereignty in its internal 
application unaltered into the sphere of external 
relations involve(s) a denial of the existence of any 




























































































bind itself, even by agreement"^-.
The political realities facing a state in the modern world
are such that this 'absolute sovereignty' has no practical
significance. One is forced to accept a more pragmatic
concept which leaves room for the operation of international
law. Thus, while remaining a fundamental basis of inter-state
relations, the absolute freedom of action enjoyed by a
state becomes limited "in so far as it has agreed to rules
2restricting that freedom" .
Agreements of this nature are clearly, in themselves,
sovereign acts by state actors within the international
legal system and, although the latter does not provide a
mechanism for enforcement, it specifies norms of behaviour
which states feel obliged to follow.
In the context of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man,
3the absence of international legal capacity poses a problem.
At its most basic level, the requirement for the Islands to 
adhere to international obligations is founded, not on 
sovereign expression but on constitutional obligation.
The latter allows for no prior consideration of consequences 
and affords no ability to negotiate more favouraDle terms.
Bearing in mind the threat which ever-increasing inter­
national regulation posed for insular autonomy, the British 
Government in 1950, made new arrangements to limit the 
application of treaties which it entered into on its own 
Dehalf. All foreign governments and international bodies 
were informed that treaties "relating to matters affecting
the domestic legislation of the Islands"^ would not extend




























































































On the face of it, this declaration has a very wide scope 
but there must be some doubt as to its exact legal effect. 
During the 1950s, the British Government had a policy of 
ensuring that an article was inserted into treaties:
"...providing either that the Treaty applies to territories 
'for whose international relations the United Kingdom 
is responsible' if special notice to that effect is 
given (thus implying that, in the aDsence of any such 
notice, it extends to the metropolitan territory only) 
or, in the reverse form, under which the territories are 
included unless a declaration is made, or notice given, 
that the treaty shall not apply to specified territories 
in the absence of a special acceptance on their behalf"®. 
So long as the United Kingdom was able to negotiate one or 
other of the clauses mentioned, the actual effect of the 1950 
Declaration was immaterial. During the 1960s, however, inter­
national opposition to the so called 'colonial' article, 
prompted by the anti-colonial sentiments of many newly 
independent states, led to a situation in which the United 
Kingdom was unable to secure their insertion. At this point, 
the legal and practical effects of the declaration assumed 
greater relevance, particularly for the insular authorities.
It was questionaDle whether the terms of the declaration 
were in accordance with the international law governing the 
territorial application of 'non-specifie' treaties.
Sinclair observes that the doctrine on this point is 
divided® but that the predominant opinion is in favour of a 
broad interpretation. In other words, a treaty which makes 




























































































to both the metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas of a 
state party.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflects the. 
prevailing opinion in Article 29, which states:
"Unless a different intention appears from the Treaty 
or is otnerwise established, a treaty is binding upon 
each party in respect of its entire territory".
The term 'entire territory' is widely accepted as including
9non-metropolitan entities .
A question of significance, however, is whether the 1950 
Declaration may be construed as evidence that a 'different 
intention' has been 'otherwise established', with regard to 
the application of treaties to the Islands. The fundamental 
problem is in the circumstances which justify an exception to 
the residual rule on the grounds that a different intention 
has been established, outwith the framework of a particular 
treaty. In the aDsence of any express limitation in Article 
29, the U.K.'s Declaration, vis a vis the Islands, might well 
be covered by it.
The decisive objection to this interpretation is that it
undermines the basic intention of the article. If, by making
an all-encompassing declaration, a state is able to establish
a situation in which its non-metropolitan territories are
excluded, other than where the opposite is indicated in the
text, the residual rule of Article 29 ia effectively reversed
for the state which made the declaration;
Legal certainty requires that the phrase 'otherwise
established' is limited and it is submitted that the line
*




























































































be applied to all treaties (including the 1950 Declaration)
and circumstances which specifically pertain to the treaty
under discussion. Only the latter may be considered as
establishing a different intention.
Thus, where a multi-lateral treaty is negotiated within
a regional international organisation, there may be a presum-
outside the regionption that non-metropolitan territoriesAare excluded.
Similarly, and with particular relevance to the Islands 
under discussion, a bi-lateral double taxation agreement 
may by implication be held to extend only to the metropolitan 
area due to the different taxation systems in operation in 
the dependencies.
The U.K. Government would appear to concur with this 
proposition since, in 1966, they sent a letter of clarification 
to the Islands which suostantially altered the apparent 
meaning of the 1950 Declaration (See Appendix III).
The only circumstance in which the latter continues to 
apply is where a treaty contains an article allowing the 
state to apply the treaty to its dependent territories.
In such cases, the presumption may be made that there 
was no intention otherwise to do so. The present position 
is, accordingly:
"....that the United Kingdom's acceptance of 
agreements containing no indication of limited 
territorial application, binds all the United 
Kingdom's dependent territories, including the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man"'*'̂ .
As a result, Britain is from time to time, faced with 




























































































if ever contemplates) or imposing obligations on the 
Islands which spill over into the domestic sphere and are 
therefore, perceived as a threat to their long-standing 
independence.
The three cases discussed below highlight the problem in 
practice and raise a number of more specific aspects which 
will be discussed.
(ii) The Isle of Man Broadcasting Disputes 
Manx
The issue ofADroadcasting, which was the suoject of an 
ongoing dispute in the 1960s provides one of the few 
opportunities to assess an actual conflict over the scope 
of insular competences^. In particular, there were two 
distinct episodes in the controversy and these reflect the 
two complementary aspects of continuing Westminster control.
On the first occasion, in 1962, the Home Secretary vetoed 
an item of Manx legislation, by use of the constitutional
procedure of advising the Queen in Council not to confer the
1 ?Royal Assent . The Bill which had come from Tynwald, was 
aimed at permitting the Island to allow the operation of a 
powerful commercial radio station. In addition, a request 
was made for the revocation of two Orders in Council, made 
in 1949 and 1954. These had extended to the Island, U.K. 
legislation relating to wireless and television broadcasts 
and had been consented to by Tynwald at the time.
The justification given by the British Government for the 
reiusal of all three requests was that they dealt with 




























































































by an international convention, acceded to by the United 
Kingdom on behalf of the Island. Furthermore, the legislation 
was in breach of the obligations set out in that convention . 
In reality, the Manx plan, which was to set up a ’Radio 
Luxembourg’ type of operation, fell foul of British public, 
policy and the international obligations happened to be 
a convenient means for the U.K. to defend their failure to 
agree to the requests'*-̂ .
The second episode in the broadcasting dispute occurred 
in 1967 and related to the problem of the proliferation of 
•pirate’ radio stations. These were clearly in breach of 
the 1959 Convention and because of their concentration in 
Europe, the Council of Europe decided on a separate inter­
national agreement, imposing an obligation on those member 
states which ratified, to undertake stronger enforcement 
measures^,
Meanwhile, the Isle of Man Government, having failed in 
its earlier bid for a commercial radio station, became aware 
of the publicity value of pirate radio in the light of 
transmissions made by the ship, Radio Caroline, from Manx 
waters. These were received in mainland Britain and in 
particular, by many potential tourists to the Island in 
Northern England. Furthermore, the broadcasters involved 
were very complimentary about the Island.
In order to conform to the European Agreements, the 
United Kingdom passed an act"^ which, in spite of the 
objections of Tynwald, was imposed by Order in Council upon 
the Isle of Man.




























































































one of the Manx responses was to threaten to lodge a complaint 
with the United Nations. It is difficult to gauge how potent
a threat this was. In strict law, it is doubtful whether the
17Island has any international standing and the United
Kingdom could probably have blocked the issue, had there
been any inclination on the part of other states to pursue
it in one of the United Nations' fora. In political terms,
however, there might have been some alarm in London over
the possible international reaction to a charge that the
U.K. was interfering with the Island's right of self-determination.
As soon as an entity is perceived as a 'colony', the 
international community tends to take an interest. In reality, 
Tynwald was probably less enthusiastic about this kind of
international attention, however, because full independence
18is ultimately the most likely outcome and even the 
broadcasting dispute had not engendered much insular support 
for the complete severing of ties with Britain.
What the Manx did do, was to attempt to appeal to the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, requesting arbitration. Unfortun­
ately for Tynwald, tne request had to be transmitted through 
the Home Office^ and the British Government refused to 
forward it.
The one practical outcome was the setting up of the Stonham
Working Party to study the Manx/U.K. relationship.
These events illustrate graphically the constitutional
and political weakness of the Islands when faced with an
unyielding British Government. In retrospect, however, many 
onManx officials concede that the objective they were 




























































































heard in the United Kingdom would, had it been achieved, 
have 'transcended the frontiers of the Island'.
(iii) Membership of the Council of Europe and the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
The second situation in which an international treaty has 
placed a question mark over insular autonomy, arose from the 
United Kingdom's accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights.
Once again, it is the Isle of Man which has provided the
21most notable case. In the Tyrer Judgement , the British
Government found itself condemned before the Court of Human
Rignts, when the Manx system of judicial corporal punishment
was held to amount to 'degrading treatment' within the
22meaning of Article 3 of the Convention
Both the U.K.'s ratification of the Convention and the 
subsequent declaration recognising the compulsory jurisdiction 
of the Court had expressly included the Isle of Man (and 
the Channel Islands), as had the important declaration 
allowing the right of individual petition. The inclusion of 
the Island was in accordance with Article 63(l) of the 
Convention which provided for the possibility of bringing 
dependent territories within its scope.
It is clear that a majority of people and politicians in 
the Island disapproved of this external 'interference' and 
the corporal punishment rules have not yet been removed from 
the statute book. In practice, however, no birching sentences 




























































































explained in the case of Teare v O' Callaghan2 ,̂ in which 
an appeal was lodged against a birching sentence imposed by 
a lower court. The Manx Court of Appeal held that, while 
the sentence was perfectly lawful, Manx judges should, 
in exercising their discretion on sentence, put into effect 
"a sentencing policy which is as much in conformity with 
the Isle of Man's treaty obligations as is consistent with 
the operation of Isle of Man law". Since various sentencing 
options were open to the judges, it was possiole, therefore, 
to avoid ordering the use of the birch. This policy was 
suggested by the Manx Attorney-General, in his submission.
The European Convention has also caused some concern in the 
Channel Islands, which, liKe the Isle of Man, have 'birching' 
laws which are no longer applied in practice.
The most recent occurrence which highlights the dilemma faced 
by the insular authorities is the liberalisation of the homo­
sexuality laws in Guernsey, in order to bring them in line with 
the European Convention. In this case, there was widespread 
hostility in the Guernsey States, to the new provisions and they 
were only approved for a period of three years, thus allowing
the Island to "keep to the letter of the law...without having to
24yield to the spirit of it" . It was pointed out in the debate
tnat failure to comply with the convention "would almost certainly
result in the matter Deing referred to the European Commission of
Human Rignts" and that there was no possibility of winning the
case which would ensue. It was this prospect which induced many
States' members to cast their votes against their 'better judgement'
26The Convention sets out at Article 63(3) that, where it is 
applied to the non-metropolitan territories of member States, this 



























































































which arises is when the Islands can make use of this provision.
In the Tyrer Case, the Manx Attorney-General submitted that 
the popular support for birching in the Island constituted 
a requirement which had to be taken into consideration but 
this argument was firmly rejected by the Court. According 
to their judgement, there was no reason to believe that law 
and order could not be maintained in the Island without 
corporal punishment. As Graham Zellick explains:
"Article 63 was designed for certain colonial territories
whose state of civilisation when the Convention was
drafted was thought not to permit the full application
of its provisions. Not only was the Isle of Man not such
a territory, but the prohioition contained in Article
3 was absolute and no local requirement - even if law
and order could not be maintained without corporal
punisnment - would entitle a state to make use of a
27punishment contrary to Article 3"
The conclusion to be drawn is that, in relation to other 
articles of the treaty, overseas territories may be able 
to invoke the ’local requirement' rule but for the Isle of 
Man, no such option is availaDle. One might reasonaDly expect 
the Channel Islands to be similarly affected by this non- 
application of Article 63(3).
Perhaps the main significance of the European Convention on
Human Rights is the extent to which it seeks to regulate
aspects of the criminal law. Penal provisions, in particular,
have no external effects except in the sense that outsiders
28are subject to them while in the Islands and their imposition 
or abolition was traditionally recognised as a matter solely 




























































































therefore threatened to upset the constitutional balance 
and should the Islands decide at any stage to reassert their 
historical rights in this area, the U.K. will be faced with 
the prospect of having to impose legislation in another 
field which has hitnerto fallen- within the scope of insular 
competence.
(iv) Membership of the European Communities.
The third issue which threatened to create a rupture 
between the Islands and Britain was the impending accession 
to the European Communities at the beginning of the 1970s.
At this time, it was assumed ,in the Islands that the EEC 
would shortly be moving towards the harmonisation of direct 
taxes in addition to harmonising the rates which applied 
to indirect taxation (VAT).
The Isle of Man had only just succeeded in arresting the
decline of its population and in reviving its depressed
economy, achievements brought about primarily by the abolition
29of a number of taxes and the maintenance of a low basic
income tax. Thus, EEC Membership brought the prospect of a
• * speedy return to the depressed area status of the 1950.
The prosperity of the Channel Islands was based on a 
similar favourable tax structure which seemed to be under 
threat. In addition, there was the likelihood of fierce 
competition from continental Europe, for the Islands5 
agricultural and horticultural exports to the United Kingdom.
The EEC Treaty offered little hope for the Islands in 
that Article 227(4) provided for the full inclusion of



























































































European Territories whose external relations were controlled 
oy a Member States. Nor was there any prospect that the 
Islands' special difficulties would be allowed to impede 
the whole process of U.K. accession.
The possibility of Community membership was, therefore, 
taken very seriously by the insular authorities and this 
concern was reflected both in the Royal Commission^0 and 
Stonham^1A1an§Sin6leparlte studies carried out in the Islands'^.
Having assessed the consequences, the Islands reached 
broadly the same conclusions, namely that full inclusion 
would have serious consequences on the insular economy in 
general and in certain sectors in particular. Accordingly, 
tney asked the British Government whether it would be possible 
to negotiate a special status for them which reserved their 
traditional right of access to the U.K. markets. In all other 
areas, they sought to be excluded from the provisions of the 
EEC Treaty.
Initially, the chances for a specially negotiated arrangement 
did not look very promising. What was significant, however, 
was the British Government's assurance that they would not 
impose Community membership upon the Islands. In effect, it 
would appear that they were offered independence as the only 
other option, with the likelihood of a customs barrier 
between them and the enlarged Community. One suspects that 
the motive for offering them this stark, alternative was to 
pressurise them into accepting the EEC, but it nevertheless 
indicates that where the subject matter of a convention is 
so all-encompassing as to affect wide areas of domestic 




























































































offer the opportunity for opting out. This is not to say that
the British Government neglected the views of its European
Islands in the negotiations, and the final agreement is a
testament to their efforts. Having obtained agreement on all
the main issues affecting the U.K., Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, the
Government's chief negotiator was able to obtain a spedial
status for the Islands, largely along the lines of what they
34had originally requested . This was very much an 'eleventh
hour' success which was achieved in the 'tidying-up' discussions
and in the event, the existing memDers of the Community,
proved quite willing to allow these special provisions.
Even at this stage, the United Kingdom Government indicated
that the Islands could reject the arrangements and choose
to be outside the Communities. No-one was surprised, however,
when all three chose to 'enter' and in doing so, to sustain
their special relationship with the U.K.
It is interesting to speculate what would have happened
had Britain been unable to obtain the special arrangements.
The indications are that Jersey and Guernsey might have taken
opposing stances. Guernsey made it clear that,- in the final
outcome, it would have followed the United Kingdom into the
Communities, "partly for reasons of loyalty and partly for
reasons of expediency" . Jersey, on the other hand,
seriously contemplated the possibility of remaining outside.
It is likely that the Isle of Man, which was bound more
3 6closely to Britain by its 'Common Purse' arrangement , 





























































































One might conjecture that the additional tensions which 
have prompted constitutional difficulties in the field of 
treaty application, are due to outside influences which have 
disrupted the 'political equilibrium' of tne U.K./insular 
relationship.
In order to test this, I propose to (a) classify the actors 
operating in the sphere of international treaty law as it 
affects the Islands and (b) to assess the influence capable 
of oeing exercised by the additional actors in the system.
(a) In constitutional terms, it is possiole to speak of
only two 'primary' actors in the system, namely the insular
authorities and tne British Government. As has been shown,
these are the dominant institutions in the insular legal
process and while 'secondary' actors may be capable of
37influencing the formulation of legal rules , their adoption 
and application is ultimately controlled Dy the Westminster 
or Island Governments.
It was tnerefore, possible to define the nature of insular 
autonomy in terms of an 'equilibrium' which although having 
no basis in legal theory, was arrived at in practice through 
a process of political compromise.
In the context of treaty obligations, it is postulated 
that a third category of actor exists, external to the 
relationship, out capaole of influencing more directly}the 
adoption and application of rules in the Islands through 
the medium of international conventions. Two types of
7 Q
'external' actor can be identified: 'third states' who 




























































































up under specific treaties.
The establishment of the latter allows us, in turn, to 
introduce a fourth actor who is the 'legal person' under 
domestic law, wnether an individual or an association. Under 
certain treaties, they may De classifed as actors in the 
sense that they are able to invoke the rights provided in 
the agreement, Defore a specially constituted judicial body.
A distinction requires to be drawn here between the types 
of situation in which the additional actors are involved.
On the one hand, there is the 'a priori' situation which is 
essentially the process of concluding a treaty which will 
apply to the Islands. On the other, one may talk of 'a 
posteriori' situations which arise once the commitment has 
Deen made to the international obligation.
This distinction will be utilised in conjunction with 
the terms 'adoption' and 'application' which are used to 
descrioe the nature of the influence exerted by the additional 
actors.
In 'a priori’ situations, one can only speak of the 
adoption of legal rules and in this case, third states will 
be the only additional actors whose influence need be 
assessed. At the 'a posteriori’ stage, there may be adoption 
or application, the former occurring where the treaty 
provides a mechanism for supplementary legislation and the 
latter, either because a judicial system has been set up 
or because contracting states invoke the established 
international legal procedures when another state party 
has failed to apply the rules. It is clear that a more 




























































































here. The third state and the supranational organ may, 
under the provisions of a treaty, have a role to play in 
supplementary rule-making. In addition, these may be joined 
by individuals, in having locus standi before tbe judicial 
process which has been constructed. Finally, third states 
alone are aDle to make use of international legal mechanisms 
against a state which Dreaches its treaty obligations.
It is hoped, by the construction of this model, to 
highlight the various avenues open to 'additional* actors 
in influencing the legal development of the Islands.
(b) Looking firstly at 'a priori' problems, a prerequis­
ite for the elevation of third states to actors is to be 
found in the United Kingdom's scale of priorities. There 
must be a political will to proceed with the treaty concerned, 
notwithstanding any difficulties raised by insular object­
ions. As has Deen noted, Britain is very reluctant to allow 
the Islands to influence their freedom of movement in the 
international sphere and accordingly, this prerequisite is 
almost invariably fulfilled.
At the negotiating stage, third states may insist upon 
a territorial application clause, extending the treaty to 
tne non-metropolitan territories of the parties. Alternatively, 
they may ensure the exclusion of a territorial limitation 
clause, thus allowing the residual rule of the Vienna 
Convention to take effect.
In the substantive area, other states may quite simply 





























































































In the international legal instruments which gave rise to
3 Qthe Man broadcasting disputes , it may be assumed that 
third states were instrumental in the formulation of the 
provisions and, by virtue of tne U.K.'s accession, obtained 
an indirect role in regulating the Islands.
Where the United Kingdom is seeking to oecome a party to 
an already existing treaty, this external role is likely to 
be greater since the basis of the negotiations will be an 
existing set of rules arrived at entirely by third countries, 
and the large scale amendment of these rules may be difficult 
to secure.
The EEC situation highlignts this phenomenon, notwithstand­
ing the ability of the U.K. to negotiate the amendment of 
Article 227 and thereby limit the scope of application of 
the Treaty to the Islands. In substantive terms, the Islands
are still required to apply the Community rules relating
40to free movement of goods and agriculture . Many of these
rules were enacted by the original 'Six' and their effects
41on the Islands are quite significant . The external influence, 
although indirect, is clearly established.
In addition to exercising this influence at the 'a priori'*
stage, third states may also contribute 'a posteriori' 
where the treaty allows for supplementary rule-making, in which 
the state parties play an active part. The European Communities' 
structure is an example of this with the Council involvement 
in Community lawj which is then translated into insular law.
The development of law-making international organisations 




























































































The second aspect of 'a posteriori’ third state influence 
is in the field of application. There is little evidence 
that insular action is actually scrutinised Dy third states 
to ensure compliance with international obligations but the 
prospect of such scrutiny may induce the United Kingdom to 
secure the Islands' adherence, in order to pre-empt criticism 
and diplomatic pressure from other contracting parties.
Tne most interesting development of international law, in 
terms of assessing the insular relationship with other 
actors through the medium of treaty rules, is the already 
mentioned tendency towards the setting up of organisations 
with supranational powers. This is done, either by establishing 
bodies capable of interpreting and applying treaty rules 
in a judicial manner (The European Court of Human Rights and 
the European Court of Justice) or by going a stage further 
and conferring upon treaty institutions, an independent or 
semi-independent legislative capability (The European Communities 
Commission).
Where this occurs, it is no longer possible to consider the 
treaty simply as a static instrument reflecting in its provisions 
the intention of tne drafters at the time of conclusion. It is, 
instead, the constitutive document in an evolving system and, 
as such, it is likely to produce unexpected results in terms of 
obligations subsequently imposed. This is true of both the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the European Community 
Treaties. Admittedly, the former has no legislative mechanism and 
the rules are established in principle, from the outset. The 
system, however, in providing a Court of Human Rights, allows for 



























































































and, by extension, permits a degree of creativity on the 
part of the judges. (This applies also to the E.C.J.)
Judicial creativity is Dound to impose unforeseen restrictions 
on a government which is legally committed to upholding the 
Court's decisions. In the same way, it will restrict the 
freedom of action of tne unsuspecting insular authorities.
The Tyrer Case is a clear example of this.
Where a treaty provides for supplementary rule-making, the 
Islands will be subject to the same effect, although Member 
State governments are able to avoid it, assuming they retain 
some control over the decision-making process.
Thus, we find that third states assume a more direct role 
in 'a posteriori' law-making (in tne legislative sense).
In addition, another form of external actor now operates at 
tnis level, namely the 'supranational' organ (Commission of 
the European Communities, Commission of Human Rights,
E.C.J., Court of Human Rights). These bodies may be involved 
in both the adoption and the application of legal rules.
Finally, we see the introduction of the fourth actor in 
the legal process. The individual is now capable of utilising 
his access to the international courts in order to secure his 
rights and, in so doing, to contribute to the application of 
internationally agreed rules. As will be illustrated later, this 
last actor may be significant because his motives in seeking 
the enforcement of legal rules will differ from those of the 
other actors and in many instances, he is the only actor who 
is likely to nave a sufficient interest in the outcome.
As a result of this development, it is submitted that 




























































































(1) Where the Islands request it, the United Kingdom is
in certain treaties
still able to negotiate ,A either their exclusion or a special 
arrangement. Due to modern trends, however, this can no 
longer be guaranteed in every case.
(2) Accordingly, the U.K.'s relationship with the Islands 
must not be regarded in isolation. One must take into account 
the broader context of Britain's commitment to participate
in an evolving world legal order.
(3) By transferring legislative competences and judicial 
control to supranational institutions, the United Kingdom
has ceased to be the sole entity which is capable of impinging 
upon the Islands' autonomy, by its legislative actions.
(4) In the 'a priori' situation, the U.K. has conceded the 
right of the Islands to end the relationship should the 
latter decide that a particular set of international rules 
to which Britain is committed, ought not to be applied to 
them.
(5) In 'a posteriori' situations, the United Kingdom may 
have to face the dichotomy of international obligation and 
insular autonomy due to an unexpected evolution in the system 
estaolished under a particular treaty.
(6) Preservation of the relationship is an insular priority; 
accordingly, the tendency is for the Islands ultimately to 
accept international obligations imposed upon them, albeit 
unwillingly. Emphasis is therefore shifted to the symbolic 
aspects of tneir autonomy (prior consultation, local enactment 
of international rules.)
(7) Although growing international regulation and the increasing
influence of external actors creates a potential for destabil­
ising



























































































the U.K./insular relationship, the strength of that relationship 
has so far been sufficient to withstand the pressures.
This last point leads us to consider two further aspects 
which will be discussed in the remaining sections of this 
paper.
Firstly, there is the question of the Islands’ present 
and potential status under international law. An examination 
of this may help to throw some light, both on the legal 
uncertainty of the insular position, which is illustrated in 
the foregoing discussion, and on their continuing stability 
in practice.
Secondly, one should assess how the various actors deal 
with international regulation in fields where no controversy 
has occurred. The three situations discussed previously 
represent in fact, the only major problems wnich have arisen 
out of the U.K.'s exclusive treaty-making power. In this 
connection, I propose to examine the practice with regard 
to the most prolific source of external rules; the European 
Community and this in turn may allow one to explain, in the 
context of international regulation as a whole, the continuing 
substantial autonomy exercised by the Islands, in the face 




























































































II. The International Legal Status of the Islands
(i) Aspects of International Personality.
In this discussion, the traditional view that only states
are subjects of international law, is clearly no longer
tenaDle. The list of types of entity possessing some form
of international personality has grown since the end of the
Second World War, the most often quoted 'new' actor in this
42field Deing tne international organisation
In addition, it is widely accepted that other territorial
units, which do not have the attributes of full statehood,
now may be said to possess some degree of international 
43personality .
I propose to assess wnether tnis is the case with the
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, adopting the simple
definition of Grieg, who states tnat:
M(A)n international person is an entity having the power
44of independent action on tne international plane"
From this definition, it is evident that the proof of inter­
national personality lies in the establishment of certain 
factual circumstances and it is postulated that only two 
aspects need be considered in order to test this.
Firstly, one should ask whether the Islands are legally 
capable of concluding international agreements independent 
of the U.K. and whether in fact they have done so.
Secondly, one needs to establish whether they are members 
or potential members of any international organisation, and 
if so, wnether the circumstances of that membership Justify 
the conclusion that they are 'international persons'.




























































































territories which are not fully sovereign are capable of 
enjoying some international personality. Broadly speaking, 
tnese may fall into two categories. Firstly, there are units 
of some federal states which have been endowed with a degree 
of independent capacity in the international arena. One may 
cite in this category, the province of Quebec which has been
A RaDle to enter into treaties on cultural questions , under
powers conferred with some reluctance, by the Canadian Govern- 
46ment . Secondly, there are examples of non-metropolitan 
or colonial entities Deing given the power to negotiate and 
conclude international treaties. This was the case with the 
British dominions wnich, under a process of evolving indepen­
dence, oDtained limited international legal capacity, prior
to the date when they could be regarded as sovereign nations
47in their own right
For tne Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, however, it 
is not possible to point to any capacity of this kind and 
the investigations (and conclusions) of the Royal Commission 
make it clear that the U.K. possesses exclusive treaty-making 
competence on behalf of the Islands. This is borne out by 
the practice and the only instruments which are in any way 
analogous to treaties, are a number of double taxation 
agreements48. Since none of these involve third countries, 
however, they may more appropriately be decribed as a form 
of internal legal instrument.
Looking now at tne memDership of international organisations,
the federal/colonial distinction may once more be drawn. In
practice, there are very few instances where units of a 




























































































but one notaole example is to be found, perhaps surprisingly,
in the United Nations. Byelorussia and the Ukraine, which
are federal divisions of the U.S.S.R., are full members
of the organisation and their ’personality' is thus assured.
Among dependent territories and colonies, a more widespread
involvement in international organisations may be cited
as evidence of some degree of personality. Several organisations,
including offshoots of the U.N. allow participation of
territories which are not fully sovereign and this may range
from full membership to observer status. An example of the
former is the Caribbean Community and Common Market wnich
has, since its inception, consisted of a mixture of states
49and dependencies .
It is necessary, when talking of international organisations, 
to draw a distinction Detween governmental and non-governmental 
Dodies. The involvement of associations from non-sovereign 
entities, in the latter category, cannot De invoked as 
evidence that they have international personality. Thus, for 
instance, the participation of a local Red Cross organisation 
in the International Red Cross Federation, does not allow 
this presumption.
There is nothing in principal to prevent the Isle of Man
and the Channel Islands obtaining some form of membership, in
organisations whose statutes allow for the admission of
howeverdependent territories. In practice,/\the Islands are not 
memDers of any governmental organs operating in the inter­
national sphere and it is douDtful whether Britain would 
sanction any insular attempt to become involved in this area.




























































































from the United Kingdom, in the British Commonwealth. Only- 
sovereign states are full members, however, and the place 
of tne dependent territories in the Commonwealth, is solely 
by virtue of the memDership of the metropolitan state to which 
they are attacned. As was noted in the Isle of Man broadcasting 
disputes, the Manx could not gain access to the Secretariat 
of tne Organisation, in order to voice tneir complaints,
SODecause the U.K. Government refused to transmit the request .
The conclusion may be drawn, therefore, that from the 
point of view of involvement in international treaties and 
organisations, tnat the 'British* Islands have no legal 
capacity and, in accordance with Grieg's definition, one 
cannot describe them as 'international persons'.
(ii) The International Legal Definition of the Islands' Status
Bearing in mind the Islands' lack of international 
personality, it is possible to limit a study of international 
definitions to those forms of status which may involve the 
absence of legal capacity. I propose, therefore, to look at 
only the two broad categories which, although not consisting 
wholly of entities without international personality,
51fulfil this requirement: (l) Non self-governing territories
52and (2) territories which are perceived in a unitary sense , 
as part of a larger sovereign entity. .
The adoption of the former as a category in international 
law requires further elaboration. The existing terminology 
which is employed to describe different forms of dependent 




























































































of dependency forms which exist in practice . In addition, 
the choice of a particular term may be influenced by non- 
legal considerations. Thus, a particular territory may be 
classified as having a 'colonial' structure for political 
reasons. Crawford goes as far as to state as a 'cardinal 
principle', that:
"...the legal incidents of a given relation are to be
determined, not by any inference from the laoel attached
to it...out from an examination of the constituent
54documents and the circumstances of the case" .
In order to overcome the definitional problems which arise 
in this area, I have chosen 'non-self-governing territory' as 
a generic term.
The first stage is to assess whether the international 
status of the Islands can be ascertained from any of the
sources of international law, namely treaty provisions (the
55primary source) , state practice (custom?) or doctrine.
The most important treaty provisions, which might have some
relevance for the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man are
to be found in Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations.
This is entitled 'Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing
Territories' and imposes a number of obligations on U.N.
Members'which have or assume responsibilities for the
administration of territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government'^. In subsequent
resolutions, the U.N. General AssemDly has taken the process
a stage further in complementing the above-mentioned duties
of metropolitan states with rights for the dependencies involved.




























































































Known as the 'Declaration on the Granting
andColonial Countries and Peoples',Awhich established the 
fundamental right of all peoples, to self-determination*^8.
The central question here is whether the Islands may be
said to fall within the scope of these provisions. In other
words, are they to be classified as 'non-self-governing
territories'. In spite of the existing legal limitations
on their autonomy, the answer to this question would appear
to be negative. The U.N. General Assembly, in Resolution
591514 and other statements has made it clear that they are 
only dealing with colonial territories, and in spite of the 
conclusion reached in Chapter 2, the Islands under consider­
ation are not perceived internationally as such. Accordingly, 
the U.N. General Assembly 'Committee of Twenty-Four', set up 
in pursuit of Resolution 1514 to monitor the progress towards 
self-determination of certain entities, has never paid any 
attention to the position of Britain's offshore islands.
A consequence of this conclusion is that, despite the 
prevailing opinion in the Islands that they are entitled to 
self-determination, such a right, if it exists, does not 
derive from the principles of international law as enumerated 
by the United Nations.
Another source which might have helped one to ootain an 
internationally authoritative definition of the Islands' status, 
was the judgement of the international arbitration court, 
set up to resolve conflicting British and French claims on 
the extent of their respective continental shelves in the 
English Channel80.




























































































tne United Kingdom claim was based on the suDmission that
the former had their own continental shelf which joined
that of the 'mainland' in the middle of the Channel. In
support of this, they stated that the Islands were;
"...in effect'island States enjoying an important
degree of political, legislative, administrative
and economic independence of ancient foundation1 .
This is the only occasion on which the U.K. has sought to
attribute 'statehood', aloeit of a limited nature, to the
Channel Islands and it should be appreciated that their aim
was to maximise the amount of sea area in the Channel over
which they could exercise jurisdiction. It is doubtful
wnether they would be prepared to concede this definition,
in any other circumstances.
What was more significant in this case, was the view
taken by the Court of Arbitration as to the status of the
Islands. In their decision, they stated that they:
"...must treat the Channel Islands only as islands of
the United Kingdom, not as semi-independent states,
entitled in their own right, to their own continental
& 2shelf vis-a-vis the French Republic"
This decision is clearly not legally decisive in determining 
the Islands' international status but it may nevertheless 
be viewed as persuasive, in any attempt to define that status. 
In the absence of any clear statement emanating from the 
traditional sources of international law, it is worth 
considering two practical criteria which might be postulated 
as determinants. These are (l) the internal constitutional
•a. y  • . r “V'




























































































(1) On the face of it, the first provides a simpfe test of 
the status of an entity in international law by assimilating 
it with the constitutional structure in existence. Thus,
the two concepts are, in effect, merged. While such an 
approach would oontriDute to legal clarity, there are two 
overriding objections, one of principle and the other of 
practice.
The first is that the metropolitan state would control 
the international status of an entity, by its choice of 
constitutional form and it must be doubtful whether an , ,
international legal definition can be construed in this way, 
from the unilateral actions of a single state.
The second more practical objection, relates to the already 
mentioned activities of the United Nations in this area, and 
the complete exclusion of the 'British' Islands from the 
international process which has Deen developed regarding 
non-self-governing territories. Thus, we nave a situation 
in which the U.K. categorises the Islands as dependencies, 
outside the metropolitan area while the international 
community places the Islands within the United Kingdom for 
international purposes. The adoption of this criterion, serves 
therefore to confuse rather than to clarify the position.
(2) This leads us to consider the merits of the second _ v 
criterion - international recognition. It is possible, by 
drawing an analogy with the constitutive theory of .recognition 
to arfoue that the Islands' status may be deduced from the 
attitudes adopted by members of the world community,, either
O
expressly or by implication. This clearly intrduces an element 




























































































a legal definition susceptible to the overt political influences 
which characterise recognition in international law^.
Despite this, it is arguaoly a more realistic criterion in 
that it links the definition to the realities of inter­
national perception.
In adopting the recognition requirement, the question now 
arises as to whether there has oeen sufficient express or 
implied recognition of the Islands as 'non-self-governing 
territories', or whether, in the aosence of such recognition, 
they must be viewed merely as part of the territory of the 
United Kingdom for international purposes.
In certain respects, the special status of the Islands may
be said to nave Deen recognised by the state actors in the
world community. The aosence of ODjections to the terms of
65tne 1950 Declaration may be cited as evidence of recognition 
tnat the Islands were not part of the U.K. albeit that this 
can only be construed from the silence of the other states. 
Similarly, every time a state has accepted a territorial 
exclusion clause in a treaty (or indeed a clause which extended 
the agreement under consideration to the Islands), it might 
be said to have explicitly recognised the Islands' dependent 
status. The same conclusion could perhaps be drawn from the 
Member States' acceptance of a special arrangement under 
the European Communities.
It is submitted, however, that in these cases, the recog­
nition was not of a particular international status but 
simply of a different internal constitutional system which 
third states were prepared not to disrupt, if it could be 




























































































increasingly inclined to reject the 'colonial article' in 
other treaties. The fact that' in some cases, the territorial 
application has been limited cannot, therefore, be invoked 
for the general purpose of ascertaining international status.
What is far more persuasive in this discussion is the 
aosence of recognition for the Islands in international fora, 
and in particular in the United Nations.
In conclusion, it may be stated that, by adopting the 
recognition criterion, in conjunction with what little is 
to be found of a legal or quasi-legal nature, the most 
appropriate definition is that the Islands are, under inter­
national law, part of the territory of the United Kingdom.
Their peculiar constitutional situation must, in this sense, 
be regarded merely as another form of internal arrangement, 
adopted by a sovereign nation, for the administration of 
its territory.
In practice, this dichotomy between the constitutional 
and international positions means that the Islands cannot 
look to the norms of international law for the legal guarantees 
which they lack in their relationship with the United Kingdom. 
On the other hand, as has been shown, the legal position 
contrasts sharply with the situation in reality and the 
insular authorities presently have no interest in obtaining 
a separate identity in the international order. This is 
in keeping with the low profile which they are anxious to 
maintain. In addition, where there is no international 
interest in the Islands, there is no external pressure being 
exerted on Britain. Whether this attitude will change depends 




























































































where insular autonomy is at stake. Treaty obligations 
would again, seem the most likely source of future problems.
In the following chapter, dealing with the particular 
aspects of the insular relationship with the European 
Communities, I propose to analyse the way in which the 
Channel Islands and the Isle of Man have been able to 
minimise the difficulties which have arisen from one 
particular treaty. The conclusions to be drawn from this 
may help one to explain the continuing stability of the 
relationship in the face of external pressures.
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Chapter 4 - The Islands and the European Communities
I. The Background to the Membership question and the Islands'
Fears.
Some mention has already been made of the problems which arose 
when the U.K. sought to join the European Communities, and of the 
satisfactory outcome which was negotiated.
As an introduction to the discussion of the specific EEC 
issues, however, it is worth considering the background to the 
membership question and, in particular, the expected economic 
effects of both full 'membership' and full exclusion.
A fundamental general observation is tnat small, insular 
economies are likely to be more vulneraole to external factors 
because of the limited scope of tne economic activities which 
they undertake^. In essence, the reliance on one or a few products 
for export income renders an island's economy susceptible, not 
only to a general recession, as is the case with diversified 
larger economies, out to particular occurrences which might 
disrupt the rnartet in their principal product or products.
In comparison witn other island dependencies, the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man have, in fact, succeeded in achieving 
greater economic diversity. Their economies remain, however, 
sufficiently limited in order for them to experience severe 
difficulties, when one particular sector is disrupted.
Tnis is proDably the most important underlying feature to be 
borne in mind, in assessing insular fears about the prospect of 
EEC membership.




























































































of the insular economies and to describe the expected impact 
of the EEC in each case.
(l) Finance Industry
The finance industry now represents the most important sector 
in the economies of all three Islands. Their attractiveness in 
this area may be attriDuted to the following main reasons:
(i) Low tax rates and the absence of certain forms of tax.
(ii) Confidentiality - guaranteed to clients
(iii) Political stability
(iv) The existence of a legal infrastructure .
Clearly, the loss or erosion of one or all of these attraations 
would place the Islands in a less favourable position vis-a-vis 
potential investors and financial institutions wishing to 
establish tnemselves. One might have expected the first two, 
in particular, to oe susceptible to Community regulation. It 
is, therefore, perhaps surprising that the experts who were 
commissioned to examine the effects of Community Membership on 
the Islands, should have concentrated only on the taxation 
aspects of the EEC, in their assessment of how the finance 
industry would be influenced.
With regard to direct taxation, there was some fear of a 
Community-wide harmonisation of rates but it was recognised that 
this was "sufficiently remote to fall well outside the time- 
scale of effective forward planning"^. A number of more indirect 
potential effects were also identified, particularly with regard 
to the attraction of the Islands for wealthy residents^ but 
given that the Communities had not adopted any definitive rules 




























































































on conjecture as to the speed of harmonisation.
With regard to confidentiality, it seems likely that the 
Islands were aware of a possible future 'threat1 from the EEC 
but the sensitivity of this suoject may have resulted in an 
unwillingness to commit views to paper.
The EEC commitment to the transparency of the market necessarily 
involves rules aoout disclosure. Tnis itself, should present 
no particular fear for the Islands, since they are anxious in 
any case to emphasise the quality of their finance industry , 
but there must have been some alarm at the prospect of Community 
rules which, for instance, provided for central Dank supervision, 
involving access to files. It is difficult to persuade investors 
tnat, once legal access is established in this way, tne infor­
mation wnich oecomes available will not be passed on to the 
Inland Revenue .
The general conclusion, however, seems to have been that, 
in the medium term, the finance industry would not be signifi­
cantly undermined. On the other hand, as Colin Powell pointed out:
"The existence of a haven for funds from Memoer States 
within the EEC, is in direct conflict with the principles 
of the Treaty...For this reason, the long-term finance 
centre prospects would not be encouraging, if Jersey was 
included in the EEC" .
By staying outside the Communities, the Islands could have 
maintained their low tax structure. In addition, they could 
have avoided the main threat to confidentiality, outlined above. 
Clearly, in this area, certain Community rules with extra­
territorial effect would have had some consequence, given that





























































































The main problem here, however, would have been stability. 
Politically, one might have expected the Islands to remain 
stable but, as has Deen shown, the relationship with the U.K. 
would have been dramatically altered. In particular, it is 
difficult to imagine that the Islands could have had a future 
within the Sterling Area, especially given the Community's 
long term aim of monetary union.
(ii) Agriculture^
With regard to agriculture, entry into the EEC was anti­
cipated as having a major impact upon the Islands, in two 
specific respects.
Firstly, concerning prices, the important new consideration 
was the level of the European target price for insular 
agricultural produce. In respect of milk, the high cost of 
production in the Channel Islands cast a shadow over the 
future of their dairy industry. It was pointed out that:
"For supplies to be maintained, returns must oe adequate 
to keep farmers' incomes at an acceptable level, and these 
returns can only oe secured through a price level aoove 
the EEC target price, or through additional assistance 
from public funds"^^.
On the other hand, the EEC prices for cereals were higher than 
those in the Isle of Man (the only Island with significant 
cereal production). Although increased prices would, therefore, 
benefit cereal producers a Knock-on effect could be anticipated 
since cereal foodstuffs represented a significant proportion 
of the costs in the dairy sector.




























































































the removal of trade barriers, which was likely to affect the 
Islands in two ways. Firstly, by allowing the access of 
European produce to the insular markets, there was a danger 
that certain sectors of home production would Decome 
uncompetitive and again, it was the dairy industry which was 
expected to suffer. In addition, tne Channel Islands might 
De required to allow the import of live cattle, something 
wnich had hitherto been forbidden, in the interests of preserving 
tne purity of local creeds. Secondly, witn regard to exports, 
the removal of tariff carriers oetween Britain and the rest 
of Europe meant that the traditional preferential treatment 
afforded to the Islands by the U.K., would cease. This was 
very serious for the horticultural industry of the Channel 
Islands and, in particular, for tomato exports from Guernsey, 
which would now have to face stiff Dutcn competition.
It is clear from this brief outline of the effect of 
Community membersnip in the agricultural/horticultural sector, 
tnat the Islands could expect a major restructuring and, in 
all probability, a diminution of their industries, if faced 
with the strict application of Community law. Guernsey, in 
particular, whose tomato production represented its single 
most important source of export earnings, offers a clear 
illustration of the vulnerability of entities with a limited 
economic base.
Had the Islands stayed outside the Community, they would 
have been able to protect their internal production insofar 
as it was oriented towards internal consumption. The export 
market, however, in certain products, would prooably have 




























































































have resulted in a complete reversal of their competitive 
position, vis-a-vis the Netherlands.
(ill) Tourism1 1
Tne tnird major economic activity which the Islands have 
in common is tourism and, once again, Community Membership 
offered the prospect of cnanges which potentially could harm 
the industry.
A distinction must be drawn here between the Channel Islands
and the Isle of Man on account of the fact that only the
12latter is in full customs union with the U.K. The effect of 
this 'Common Purse' arrangement is that, in most respects, the 
Island is subject to the same indirect taxes in operation in 
Britain (i.e. consumption taxes). Thus, the introduction of a 
Value Added Tax, although having some effect on Manx prices, 
would not necessarily have been serious and in any case, 
would have not altered their competitive position with regard 
to United Kingdom resorts.
For the Channel Islands, the situation was, and still is, 
very different. They had no general indirect taxes and excise 
duties were considerably lower than in the U.K. Thus, they 
were able to offer potential tourists, highly competitive 
prices for accomodation, consumer goods, food,alcoholic drinkd 
and tobacco.
On the assumption that V.A.T. would have to be introduced
at a rate of between 10% and 15%t and that excise duties would
oe harmonised, it was calculated that prices would rise
13between 3% and 5% for a period of four to five years . This 
would clearly have eroded any competitive advantage which 




























































































By remaining outside the Community, the Islands could have 
avoided the aoove mentioned effects on their tourist industry.
From this Drief and selective summary of the conclusions 
reached by the insular authorities with regard to the efiects 
of Community membership on their industries, the reasons for 
seeKing a special arrangement are manifest. The Islands 
understandably had to assess the future effects of membership 
on the assumption that the process of integration would occur 
more speedily than has turned out to be the case. In the event, 
many of the fears which they expressed related to developments 
which have not yet occurred. Nevertheless, some of their 
predictions have proved correct, despite the limited nature 
of the relationship finally agreed.
In the following section, I propose to examine the basic 
legal documents governing the special relationship between 
the Islands and the European Communities.
II. The Scope of Application of Community Rules in the Islands
(i)The EEC Treaty provision, which establishes a legal relation-
14ship between the Islands and the Community is Article 227.5(c) 
which states:
"This Treaty shall apply to the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure the 
implementation of tne arrangements for those Islands set 
out in the Treaty concerning the accession of new Member 
States to the European Economic Community and the 




























































































The arrangements referred to in this clause are to be found 
in Protocol 3 to the Act of Accession (see appendixrv ) and this 
is, in practice, the constitutive legal document of the 
special relationship wnich was negotiated. The Protocol has 
only six articles and it would seem, in some respects, that 
the drafters chose to sacrifice clarity in favour of brevity.
Article 1.1. begins by stating that "(t)he Community rules 
on customs matters and quantitative restrictions... shall apply 
to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under the same 
conditions as they apply to the United Kingdom". It then goes 
on to specify, in particular^ the applicability of the rules 
wnich govern the progressive abolition of customs duties and 
charges naving equivalent effect.
This is the fundamental provision of the Protocol, which 
places the Islands inside the Common External Tariff and under 
an obligation to allow the free movement of goods.
Article 1.2 deals with the application of the agricultural 
regime to tne Islands. The rules regarding levies and import 
measures, which are clearly assimilable with the provisions of 
Article 1.1, are applied in the first paragraph. The second 
paragraph states that "Such provisions of Community rules...as 
are necessary to allow free movement and observance of normal 
conditions of competition in trade in these products shall 
also be applicable". Finally, paragraph three of Article 1.2 
places an obligation on the Council to "determine the conditions 
under which the provisions referred to in the preceding sub- 
paragraphs shall be applicaole to these territories".
Although the specific articles of the EEC Treaty with which 
the Islands are bound to comply are not indicated, it is 




























































































Articles 30-36 on tne elimination of quantitative restrictions 
are included.
The extent, of the operation of the Agricultural Policy is 
clarified in Council Regulation 706/73 (See Appendix V), 
which was suoseauently issued in accordance with Article 1.2 
sun-paragraph three of tne Protocol. This Regulation is 
discussed further below.
Article 2 of the Protocol guarantees the existing rights 
enjoyed Dy the Channel Islanders and Manx in the United Kingdom 
Dut excludes them from Community provisions relating to the 
free movement of persons and services. Thus, it is implicitly 
indicated tnat tne Islands are excluded from these areas of 
tne Treaty.
Article 3 ensures that, if at any stage in the future, 
'persons' or 'undertakings' as defined in Article 196 of the 
Euratom Treaty, embark upon activities governed by the Atomic 
Energy Community, the Euratom rules will apply to them in full.
Article 4 is the clause wnicn imposes upon the insular 
authorities tne obligation to apply 'equal treatment' to all 
natural and legal persons of the Community.
Article 5 allows for the adoption of 'safeguard measures' 
by the Council "(i)f, during the application of the arrangements 
defined in this Protocol, difficulties appear on either side 
in relations between the Communities and tnese territories”.
Finally, Article 6 limits the definition of a 'Channel 
Islander' and a 'Manxman', for tne purpose of the rights 
excluded under Article 2. Accordingly, all residents of the 
Islands, born, adopted, naturalised or registered in the U.K., 




























































































are expressly omitted from the definition. So too, are Islanders 
who have "at any time Deen ordinarily resident in the United 
Kingdom for five years".
Regulation 706/73, which sets out the applicaDle agric­
ultural rules contains four substantive articles of which 
the first three are of specific interest.
Article 1 renders applicable, most of the provisions of 
the agricultural trade regime, the main exceptions being the 
rules on refunds and monetary compensation amounts. Article 
1.2 estaDlishes that the Islands and the U.K. are to be 
treated as a 'single member state' for the purpose of applying 
the agricultural rules while Articles 1.4 and 1.5 prohibit 
the Islands from granting aid in excess of the amounts of 
refunds, compensatory amounts and export credits estaDlisned 
Dy the EEC.
Article 2 imposes upon the insular authorities, tne require­
ment to suomit aid schemes to the Commission for approval and 
reserves the right of the Council to apply other state aid 
provisions (Articles 92-94 EEC) 'insofar as this proves necessary.1
Article 3 lists the specific agricultural areas in which 
Community rules are applicable to the Islands.
(ii) A numoer of questions arise from these provisions. In 
particular, Article 1 of the Protocol, in conjunction with 
Regulation 706/73, and Article 4 of the.Protocol are open to 
interpretation.
With regard to Reg.706/73, it is suDmitted that certain 
provisions could be in conflict with the aims of Protocol,




























































































compensatory amounts and export credits, although consistent
with the non-involvement of the Islands in Community funding"^,
could in fact, lead to a disruption of the market conditions.
With respect to aids and export credits, the Islands are
expressly forbidden from exceeding the amounts granted within 
17the Community . Tnere is no obligation requiring them to equal 
these amounts, however, and accordingly, while the Communities 
are protected from unfair competition from the Islands, the 
reverse is not the case.
It may justly De argued that this is a matter for the 
insular authorities since it is within their capabilities to 
remove this disequilibrium by matching the Community aid granted.
In any event, the situation has arisen because of the Islands' 
desire to avoid European taxation and this could only be 
acnieved by their complete exclusion from the system of Community 
funding.
Monetary Compensation Amounts present particular problems 
which will oe considered in a later case study. It is sufficient 
to note at the moment that, since they are intended to remove 
market distortions caused by fluctuating currencies, their non­
application in trade oetween European Memoer States (except 
Britain) and the Islands may lead to such distortions occurring.
A further problem relates to the legal scope of Article 
2 of Regulation 706/73 which deals with aid scnemes. The 
question which arises is whether this provision covers 
all aids or only those in the agricultural/horticultural 
field. Regulation 70b was enacted in pursuance of Article 1.2 
of the Protocol which gave the Council legal authority to 
determine the conditions 'referred to in the preceding sub- 




























































































their scope of action to matters covered in Article 1.2 - 
in otner words, only agricultural matters. Article 2 of 
Regulation 706/73 refers, however, to aids other than those 
covered in the preceding article (refunds, compensatory 
amounts, export aids.) By adopting a broad view, Article 2 
may oe held to encompass aids to industry, including the 
sensitive area of tax exemptions and in a recent document,
TO
trie Commission has taken this view . It must be doubtful, 
however, whetner the Council was empowered to deal with 
non-agricultural matters under the Protocol, when it adopted 
Regulation 706/73.
Tne lesser interpretation is that the provisions mentioned
only deal with specific aids such as fuel suosidies or capital
grants for the agricultural industry.
Turning now to Article 4 of the Protocol, the question is,
once again, one of scope. On the face of it, Article 4 must be
interpreted in a broad sense, to cover all aspects of Community
involvement. Accordingly, any discrimination which is precluded
under the Treaty would oe covered. Within the Islands, however,
tne tendency has been to regard this rule only in terms of
19discrimination as it affects the movement of workers . Thus, 
having altered their laws to provide for the equal treatment 
of all Community nationals in this area, the insular authorities
20nave adopted the view that their obligations have been fulfilled ,
in this respect. Curiously enough, the Commission seems to
21take the same view . If the intention was so limited, it is 
certainly not reflected in the wording of Article 4 and this 
would appear to be a clear example of undue brevity in the 




























































































discuss below, a numDer of situations which could be held 
to be in oreach of Article 4 of the Protocol.
From the Dasic texts, the application of two further 
provisions will be considered. Firstly, Article 5 of the 
Protocol is of interest Decause, on the one hand, it appears 
to allow the European Community the opportunity of 'policing' 
the Islands, while on the other, it affords the insular 
authorities a possibility to avoid applicaule European rules 
where special problems arise. It is clear that these two 
possibilities could, in practice, come into conflict. The 
outcome of the one case in which safeguard measures have been 
adopted, will oe assessed.
Secondly, Article 1.2 of Regulation 706/73 sets out the 
'single member state' concept and the efiect of the application 
of this will oe dealt with briefly.
(iii) Finally in this section, it is worth making mention of
the European Communities' legislation of the Islands. Jersey,
Guernsey and the Isle of Man each have a separate European
Communities law which puts into effect the applicaole
22provisions of the Community Treaties
The main point of interest is in the implementation of the
treaty arrangements and in the legal status of the Treaties
and of community instruments.
In Doth these respects, the insular legislation mirrors
the basic provisions set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the U.K.
23European Communities Act 1972 .
Thus, in principle, the insular authorities must (l) facil­
itate the application of Community regulations (which are



























































































directly applicable) and (2) take the necessary legislative 
steps to implement directives. Similarly, Island judges must 
apply European law where it is relevant, and wnere there is 
a question as to the'validity, meaning or effect'^ of a 
Community instrument, the Court may refer the matter to the 
E.C.J. for a preliminary ruling.
The extent to which the insular authorities fulfil the 
obligations set out in* their respective European Communities' 
laws will be assessed further below.
With regard to judicial application, it may be noted that 
there are very few cases involving Community law and, thus far, 
tnere nas been no request for a preliminary ruling from any 
insular court. In the Isle of Man, however, there has been 
judicial acknowledgement, Doth of the requirement to apply 
European rules and of the possibility of referring the matter, 
where there is some doubt.
It is perhaps not surprising that Community law has such a 
marginal effect on the Islands. In addition to the limitations 
Drought about by the partial nature of the relationship, there 
are also many rules which, although applicable in principle, 
are not lively to be utilised in practice. A number of issues 
have been identified, however, and these will now be considered,
III. Issues Arising from the Protocol Provisions
(i) Free Movement of Goods and Distortion of the Market 
The extent to which free movement of goods exists, even 
Detween the Member State participants in the Community, legal 




























































































customs barriers and quantitative restrictions inside the 
Community, and the efforts at eradicating charges and measures 
having equivalent effect, there are still ways in which states 
can manifest protectionist tendencies. This should always be 
borne in mind when considering the potential and actual market 
distortions whicn characterise the trading relationship between 
the European Communities and the Islands.
(a) Monetary Compensation Amounts
Tne question of Monetary Compensation Amounts (MCAs) has 
already oeen touched upon Driefly. In this section, I propose 
to consider why a divergence has occurred between the Channel 
Islands on the one hand and the Isle of Man on the other, with 
respect to tnis issue.
MCAs were initially introduced to compensate for the difference 
Detween representative or 'green' rates used for converting 
agricultural prices into national currencies, and the market 
rate for currencies. A simple explanation of the operation of 
MCAs is to De found in the Interim Report of the Tynwald Select 
Committee on the Common Market:
"...each Member State applies its own rate of MCAs, cased 
on the strength of its currency so that the goods are put 
into a neutral position by the exporting country oy means 
of eitner an export levy or refund. Where necessary, the 
price is again adjusted by the receiving country according 
to its own currency position;,* by means of either an import 
refund or levy. For countries with revalued currencies, MCAs 
are levied on imports and granted on exports, and for
countries with devalued currencies, they are levied bn




























































































For the Islands, this poses an interesting problem. Since they 
are excluded from Community funding, tney are not entitled to 
Benefit from refunds under the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (although the insular authorities are at 
liberty to match tnis amount from tneir own funds). The result 
is that insular agricultural produce, in certain circumstances, 
may Become uncompetitive.
The question is therefore, whether the Islands are required
to impose MCA levies upon agricultural goods imported or exported,
according to the currency situation.
T. Isle of Man was faced with this issue when a Manx farmer
received a Bill for £20,000 from Her Majesty's Customs and
Excise in respect of Monetary Compensation Amounts payaole on
live cattle which he had exported. Tynwald subsequently sought
an opinion from their constitutional adviser, who came to the
view that MCAs, whether they could be construed as import measures
within tne meaning of Article 1.2 of the Protocol, or simply
as an economic measure concerned with currency fluctuations,
remained, nevertheless part of the Community financing of the
Common Agricultural Policy. Since Regulation 706/73 excludes
the Islands from Community financing, the Isle of Man was not
26bound to apply MCAs .
In this particular instance, it was not a question of importing
in any case and with regard to MCAs on exports, Article 1.1
of Reg. 706/73 was cited as a further legal oasis. ("Community
rules...for trade in agricultural products...snail apply to the
Islands, with the exception of rules on refunds and on compensatory
2 7amounts granted on exports oy the United Kingdom") .




























































































Monetary Compensation Amounts. The Channel Islands, on the 
other hand, continues to do so without enjoying 'reciprocal* 
access to the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund, wnen refunds would be applicaole.
The different approaches may, perhaps be explained by the
fact that the Channel Islands have a separate system of customs
under which all duties and levies collected in the Islands go
to the local exchequers. The Isle of Man, although it now has
an independent customs service, is still bound to the U.K. by
a customs agreement under which the revenue is pooled and a
proportion is transferred to the Manx Government annually by
tne U.K. Treasury. This removes the necessity for customs
procedures but it also means that any sums collected as MCA
levies go into tne 'common purse'. The Manx will receive their
alloted snare, in accordance with the criteria set out in their
28agreement with the U.K. but the remainder of the levy, which 
is the bulk of it, will be paid into Community funds.
It may be concluded that, Dy remaining outside the Community 
funding system, the extent of integration into tne 'Common 
Market' of the Islands, depends on the support policies adopted 
Dy the insular authorities. From the MCA question, however, 
tne Manx would seem to have distanced themselves even further 
from the integrative process by ensuring the continuance of 
market distortions, so long as Sterling is aole to fluctuate 
from the representative rates.
(b) The Agricultural Marketing Boards
The second situation involving the operation of the market, 
relates to the existence of 'state' agricultural monopolies 




























































































Communities, it was generally accepted that the British 
Marketing Boards, with their sales monopolies, were in breach 
of Community law. Following a strong campaign for the retention 
of the Milk Marketing Boards, the British Government succeeded 
in 1978, in persuading the Council to issue two regulations 
(1421/78 and 1422/78) authorising the continued operation of 
the boards under certain conditions' 0̂ which Doth the Isle of 
Man and tne Cnannel Islands were capable of meeting.
In tnis discussion, what is significant is that Article 1.1 
of Regulation 1422 lists the organisations to which the U.K. 
Government may grant the rights set out in Regulation 804/68 
(as amended by Reg.1421/78). Neither the Manx, nor the Channel 
Islands' Milk Marketing Boards are included in the list although, 
in accordance with the single member state concept, the possibility 
for inclusion exists.
Cnee again, it was Tynwald which enquired into this problem
31and oDtained a legal opinion . They were advised that, in 
order to comply with Community law, they would have to seek 
an addendum to Regulation 1422/78 to cover the Isle of Man Milk 
Marketing Board.
One constitutional difficulty was identified, however, arising 
from the fact that it was the U.K. Government which had the
right of authorisation under the amended Article 25 of Regulation
'5 2804/68 . Similarly, it was the United Kingdom which would
organise producer referendums and exercise general supervision.
It was recommended by the constitutional adviser tnat the 
Government of the Isle of Man should undertake these functions.
It is difficult, however, to envisage how this could have been





























































































maintained a low profile
The Channel Islands have, in this regards and their milk 
marketing boards have hitherto avoided the strict application 
of. European law. What is not clear, however, is whether the 
lack of Community action, to bring them into line is due to 
acquiescence or ignorance.
(c) SuDsidies
The question of suosidies, is one which has arisen with
regard to the Guernsey tomato industry. Following a difficult
33year for the tomato sector in 1979 the Guernsey States
introduced a financial support contingency scheme for its
34Horticultural industry , the central feature of which was
35tne estaolishment of price support payments to tomato growers . 
The plan was not submitted, however, to the EEC Commission 
for approval. It is important to appreciate the spill-over 
effects of an aid scheme directed at a product produced 
primarily for export. Clearly, European competitors are likely
to sufier as a result and following a question in the European
•2 £
Parliament^ , the Commission investigated the matter. As a 
result, the scheme was retrospectively submitted for consider­
ation and, in tne event, the Commission's approval was granted, 
on the basis that the aid offered did not exceed Community aid 
in the same sector. Guernsey has consistently pointed to the 
suosidies granted to Dutcn growers as an example of unfair 
competition and they regarded their scheme as a means of 
restoring competitiveness.
From the previous discussion of Article 1 of Reg.706/73# 
there is little douot that Guernsey was under an ooligation 
to submit the aid scheme for approval. Article 1.1 of the 
Protocol, which applies Community agricultural rules to the 




























































































provisions of the Treaty insofar as they regulate aid given in 
the agricultural sector.
(d) Import Controls
Finally, in this suusection, it is worth considering what 
must be regarded as the central feature of the relationship 
Detween the Islands and the Communities, namely the 'free 
movement of goods'.
The fundamental rules to be applied in this respect, are 
those on customs duties, charges having equivalent effect, 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect.
Nor can there oe any douDt of the Islands' obligation to apply 
the relevant Community law.
Despite the strict legal requirements, however, a numoer 
of situations have occurred which would suggest that even 
these most basic rules are not fully adhered to. The following 
three cases are mentioned by way of example.
(i) The Manx Case of Ball v Nicholson.
This case is of particular interest because it involves one 
of the few situations in which Community law has been invoked 
in an insular court. It involved a defendant company which 
was charged with having imported ice-cream into the Isle of 
Man without a licence, contrary to the Ice-Cream (Import 
Regulation) Order, 1968^.
Before considering the case itself, it is important to 
summarise its background. Locally produced Manx ice-cream, 
whicn is more expensive than ice-cream in the U.K., is considered 
locally to be a far superior product and the Manx Government 
has traditionally employed protectionist measures to ensure 




























































































ice-cream, from outside the Island. This policy was implemented 
by means of a 'closed-licensing* system: in other words, an 
import licence was required in principle but never granted 
in practice. Following complaints from U.K.-uased ice-cream 
manufacturers, the Island, apparently in recognition of its 
European obligations, adopted an 'open-licensing' system, under 
wnich all applications would be granted.
70
The Nicholson case^ arose out of a situation in which 
ice-cream was imported without a licence and the defence 
argument was that, despite the open licensing system in operation, 
manufacturers nad to fulfil impossible conditions in order to 
obtain one. In particular, attention was drawn to condition 5 
of the licence wnich would have been issued. This stated:
"The consignment shall oe accompanied by a certificate 
issued by an official veterinarian of the competent central 
authority of tne country of origin certifying that:-
(a) it has been manufactured from milk and milk products 
coming from :-
(i) healthy animals free from mastitis
(ii) stock officially recognised as being free from 
tuberculosis
(iii) establishments situated in the centre of zones 
at least ninety Kilometres in radius, which have 
been free from foot and mouth disease for a period 
of at least sixty days.
(b) it has been prepared from milk and cream which have 
undergone neat treatment of a kind to destroy 
pathogenic germs.




























































































As the Deputy High Bailiff^ noted:
"It is...clear to^that the items (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of 
condition 5 of the Specimen Licence are of such a nature 
tnat no importer of ice-cream could have complied with 
them; and to that extent, the condition defeats the very
object for wnich it appears tnat a licence would have
40been given"
Tne Board of Agriculture and Fisheries justified the requirements 
on the grounds of puulic health but tnis was dismissed by the 
judge, who had accepted expert evidence highlighting the greater 
health ristv associated with other products on which less 
exacting requirements had been imposed. The Deputy High Bailiff 
went on to state:
"Indeed, tne only inference that I can draw is tnat tne real 
purpose of tnis particular provision is to protect the 
agricultural industry of the Island and an important 
consumer of its produce, the Island's ice-cream industry; 
which of course.... was tne purpose of the closed licensing 
s y s t e m .
Having reached tnis conclusion, he proceeded to consider the
validity of the licensing system and by reference to English
42case law , he declared condition 5 of the licence void because 
it was unreasonable.
This did not, however, render the whole licensing system void 
and, according to the law prior to the 1st of September, 1973» 
the defendant company would still nave been guilty of an offence. 
Since that date, the European Communities (Isle of Man) Act 
Aan^ th%enju^e^^n^Vel’t obliged to consider what effect, if 




























































































at Article 1.2 of Regulation 706/73, the Deputy High Bailiff
came to the following conclusion:
"...the provisions of the EEC Treaty relating to the free
movement of goods between the Island and the United
Kingdom do not apply to the products mentioned; albeit
that they apply in respect of trade between the Island
and other Member countries (a somewhat anomalous situation).
In these circumstances, and having regard to Section 2 of
the European Communities (Isle of Man) Act, the law that
4-3I must apply in this case is that of the Act of 1934 ,
44unaffected by Community law" .
It is clear that the judge did not take into account, Article 
4 of the Protocol (the equal treatment provision). Although 
this was prouaoly formulated to avoid discrimination against 
nationals of Community Member States other than Britain, it 
should have been possible to invoke it, in conjunction with 
tne basic free movement provisions, to reach the opposite 
conclusion to that adopted oy the Deputy High Bailiff.
The case is interesting in another respect because, having 
handed down a conviction against the defendant company, tne 
Manx jud6e proceeded to consider the operation of the licensing 
system vis a vis member countries of the Community other than 
the United Kingdom.
At the outset, he stated that:
"In so far as it is an impediment to trade between Members 
of the Community this licensing system is clearly contrary 
to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty in that it has equivalent 
effect to a restriction on imports; and no contrary 




























































































however, tnat it could be justified under Article 36 of
the EEC Treaty on grounds of 'the protection of health'
45or of 'public policy" .
The former ground was dismissed because local icecream was 
not subject to the same requirements. As regards public policy, 
the judge considered whether there was a need to protect local 
icecream manufacturers from unfair competition and whetner 
this could be construed as a 'public policy' requirement.
In tnis respect, ne quoted the Advocate-General in tne Van 
Duyn Case, who stated:
"Nevertneless, the particular circumstances justifying 
recourse to tne concept of public policy may vary from 
one country to another and from one period to another, 
and it is therefore necessary in this matter to allow
the competent national authorities an area of discretion
46within the limits imposed by the EEC Treaty"
The Deputy High Bailiff regarded the establishment of two 
elements as vital: (i) What were the fundamental national 
interests at stake and (ii) were the measures taken disproport­
ionate to the harm caused. His conclusion in this respect was 
that it was not possiDle to identify any fundamental national 
interests and implicit in this statement is the establishment 
of disproportionality. As he pointed out:
"It may well be that the local ice-cream industry does 
need to be protected from competition offered by producers 
wno by virtue of the very rules of the Community, are in 
a position to buy cheap butter from the Intervention 
Board, whereas they are not. But here I am in considerable 




























































































need such protection - hence the apparent change in policy 
of the Board in early 1979. Where then is the 'public 
policy'. Then again if it does need protection are the 
measures taken reasonable. It may be that an absolute 
prohibition is called for; maybe something less. But In 
that a licence may oe issued which, wnilst it purports to 
De a licence permitting the entry of this particular 
product, contains a condition which effectively prohibits 
its importation, I can only come to the conclusion that 
the system is a disguised restriction on trade and is 
therefore, in the context of inter-community trade, (i.e. 
trade other than trade between the United Kingdom and the 
Island), unlawful"^.
/ Q
(ii) The Import and Export (Control)(Jersey) Order, 1982
This order states at Article 1 that:* ’ * ’■*
"Subject to the provisions of this Order, all goods are 
prohibited to be imported into the Island or to be 
exported from the Island or shipped as ships' stores". 
Articles 2 and 3 proceed to deal with licensing arrangements, 
the main feature of wnich is the discretionary power vested 
in Jersey's finance and Economics Committee. Article 4 
states:
"Nothing in Article 1 of this Order shall be taken to 
prohibit the importation of any goods (other than the 
goods mentioned in the Schedule to this Order) which are 
proved to the satisfaction of the Agent of the Impots to 
have been brought into the Island from the United Kingdom, 
the Bailiwick of Guernsey or the Isle of Man"




























































































of the States of Jersey, sets out at Article 1:
"Il est défendu d'importer dans l'Ile des oeufs de poules 
ou de canes en coque, ou de vendre, d'exposer ou d'offrir 
en vente dans l'Ile des oeufs de poules ou de canes en...  - ÿr ■ - - ■ ' -x* / /coque qui y auront ete importes, sans qu'il ne soit inscrit 
sur la coque, le nom de son pays d'origine en lettres 
indeleDiles, ayant une hauteur d'au moins 2 millimetres" .
It is very likely that this requirement to mark the shell of 
every egg imported would be construed as a measure having 
equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction. There is no 
such stipulation for locally produced eggs and there can be 
litxle douDt that it constitutes a Darrier to trade. What is 
important in this case is whetner the provision will provoke 
a complaint from prospective importers of eggs. If this occurs,
and the EEC Commission oecomes interested, there is a possibility
52tnat tne regulation will be repealed .
It snould be noted that regulations of this kind (Triennial 
Regulations) and the equivalent instrument in Guernsey 
(Ordinances) are in force for a limited duration and do not 
require to be submitted to the Queen in Council for the 
Royal Assent. Tnus, the U.K. Government is unable to prevent 
tneir enactment, or even to point out at an early stage, any 
inconsistencies with European law.
(ii) The Equal Treatment Clause
As was mentioned earlier, Article 4 of Protocol 3, which 
states tnat 'the authorities of these territories shall apply 
tne same treatment to all natural and legal persons of the 




























































































is no free movement of any goods from non-U.K. sources to
Jersey (other tnan tne other British Islands). Whether there
is in practice depends on the licensing policy of the Finance
and Economics Committee and this is not easy to ascertain, but
the indications are tnat, with regard to certain agricultural
products, a 'no-licence' policy is in operation (e.g. milk).
A justification which has oeen given for this Order is tnat
4.0it is oased on health grounds . On the face of it, such a
sweeping law goes far beyond what is required for protection
of health upon the Island, covering as it does all goods, including
many which are unlikely to present significant health risks.
What must oe Dome in mind is the size of the administration
operated Dy the Jersey States. As a matter of practicality, a
general exclusion coupled with a licensing policy is far less
complicated than a series of laws, setting out acceptable
all
standards for the importation of^potential products. Indeed, 
it is doubtful whether any of the insular authorities could 
raise a sufficient bureaucracy to produce the volume of 
legislation required for complete coverage under the latter 
system.
Taking this into account, the 'public health' justification 
becomes somewhat more tenable. It might, however, be more 
appropriate to invoke the more general exception of 'public 
policy' on the Dasis of the above-mentioned limited resources. 
Notwithstanding this, it is difficult to imagine the law not 
being used in a protectionist way and this raises doubts 
whether it accords with Community law.
(iii) The Jersey Egg-Marking Law




























































































Islands and Dy the Commission, as encompassing only the issue 
of the movement of workers.
It is suDmitted that, from the text of the article, this 
is an undue limitation and the provision snould in fact be 
viewed more Droadly.
By adopting this view, it is possiole to identify several 
existing situations which may be in breach of article 4 .
Again, the following case studies are put forward as examples.
(a) The Import and Export (Control)(Jersey) Order, 1982 (See p.103) 
In addition to the already discussed effects of this instrument
on the free movement of goods, it may be cited in the context 
of the 'equal treatment clause'. Article 4 of the Order sets 
out a general exemption from tne licensing provisions, for 
goods imported from the United Kingdom, Guernsey and the Isle 
of Man. Thus, notwithstanding the licensing policy adopted, 
it is clear that U.K. importers nave unrestricted rights of 
access for goods, other than those listed in the schedule, 
whereas importers from other Community Member-States are obliged 
to oDtain autnorisation. This would appear, prima facie, to 
De a discrimination in ureach of Article 4 of the Protocol.
(b) The Customs Agreement between the Isle of Man and the
53United Kingdom .
Reference has already oeen made to the Customs Agreement 
wnich exists oetween the Isle of Man and the U.K. Prior to a 
recent renegotiation, it was Known as the 'Common Purse' Agreement 
and although the latter title is now erroneously used in 
referring to the arrangement, it remains an appropriate 
descriptive term, in that the Manx continue to receive a 





























































































The issue of the 'Common Purse' is one which presently
divides the Island and tnere is a strong movement in favour 
55of aorogation particularly among the tourist trade. They
tase the view tnat tourism could De revitalised in the Island,
if they were able to offer duty-reduced and duty-free items,
and cheaper accomodation costs tnrough a reduction or abolition 
56of V.A.T. Opponents of aorogation are primarily Dusinessmen
and industrialists who fear that the introduction of customs
procedures would affect business costs and drive away both
existing and potential industries. The Manx Government has
57conducted studies into tne effects of aorogation ' and, despite 
tne recent renegotiation, which resulted in the establishment 
of an independent Manx Customs service, it continues to be 
a live issue.
It is not tne purpose of this paper to examine the aorogation 
question in any depth but, with regard to th equal treatment 
provision of Protocol 3, it is possible to put forward a legal 
problem which has not hitherto entered the deflate"*®.
The eifect of the Customs Agreement, in terms of the movement 
of goods, is that all items entering the Island from the United
Kingdom, do so without any customs procedures. This has been
59made possiole by the fact that duties and V.A.T. are maintained 
at the same rate. Thus the Isle of Man and Britain are not only 
in customs union but have a largely unified system of indirect 
taxation.
On the other band, goods entering the Island from another 
Community Member State (e.g. Ireland), are subject to the 





























































































trade. Accordingly, in practice, there is no equal treatment 
Detween U.K. importers and those from other Community Memoer 
States.
Tnere are two views wnich might be adopted as to the scope 
of Article 4 in this situation.
Firstly, applying tne provision as it stands, it clearly 
has very serious effects on the operation of the Customs 
Agreement. Assuming that the Island were to extend to all 
Community nationals, the treatment it affords to U.K. importers 
under the agreement, there would be no means of preventing 
low duty items entering the Island untaxed. By definition, such 
goods would tnen have free access to the U.K. and such a 
situation would undouotedly be unacceptaDle to the U.K. Govern­
ment. Given this anomalous situation, tne whole foundation 
of tne Customs Agreement would be put in question since, in 
practice, the Isle of Man would be required to institute 
standard procedures for the importation of goods, albeit that 
they were unnecessary in the case of items arriving from the 
United Kingdom (which is the majority). Since the removal of 
customs procedures is one of the fundamental purposes of the 
agreement in the first place, there would be little point in 
having it.
The second possiDility is that an implicit limitation might 
oe read into Article 4, allowing a decree of unequal treatment, 
to the extent necessary to ensure the enforcement of internal 
taxation arrangements. This is manifestly a more rational 
approach.
The proolems outlined, however, illustrate the possible 




























































































In any event, tne Isle of Man would appear to De under an 
obligation to make tne procedures as simple as possible, in 
order to adhere to tne spirit of Article 4.
Since tne Channel Islands nave no ’Common Purse' arrangement
' "  V , . . . . . . . . .  j j j u  • - •
with the U.K., and consequently charge lower excise duties and 
no V.A.T., one might expect thereto oe no question of tneir 
creaching Article 4 in the area of customs procedures. It would 
appear, however, that they operate a simplified procedure with 
respect to goods arriving from the U.K.^, thereDy introducing
V. v-l: f "  ..  ‘ ' . “  ; ' . ■ , . ; '  ■ :
an element of discrimination cased on the origin of the imports,
(c) General *•
In addition to the two cases discussed aoove, there are many 
otner situations which, according to the wording of Article 4, 
may De held to constitute breaches of the equal treatment 
requirement. Indeed, it is entirely to De expected, given the 
special relationship which exists between the Islands and
• ' • • ‘ ' i ' - • ' . ‘
Britain, that the former will have laws which favour the 
citizens of the U.K. and accordingly, discriminate against 
otner Community nationals. The following examples further 
serve to illustrate this:
(i) The requirement that doctors practising on the Islands be 
registered in the U.K.
(ii) The different treatment afforded to British Clearing Banks 
in the Isle of Man Banking Act.
(iii) The exclusive rignts of 3ritish Telecom under the 
Telecommunications Act, 1980.
It is clear from this discussion that Article 4 in principle 
imposes a very high standard upon the Islands in respect of 




























































































unreasonable to expect them to adhere to the letter of the
law in this respect and, as a matter of practice, it has been 
have
noted that they^adopted a minimalist stance, without unfavourable 
reaction from the European Community. Tne result is that once 
again, the legal text Dears little relation to the actual 
situation.
(iii) The Single Member State Concept and Safeguard Measures
The judicial application of the single-memDer state concept 
in the Nicholson Case has already been outlined in the previous 
discussion. This is tne one situation where 'equal treatment' 
has not been applied to the detriment of U.K. nationals. In 
this section, however, I propose to examine what the exact 
meaning of the 'single member state' concept is and in 
particular to assess wnether there is any justification in 
applying it, as the Manx Deputy High Bailiff did, to exclude 
the Community free movement provisions, in respect of trade in 
agricultural products, between the U.K. and the Islands.
For reasons already stated, it is suDmitted that the 
judgement in the Nicholson Case was based on an incomplete 
examination of the European rules which are applicable to the 
Islands. It is worth also considering another situation in 
which the single memoer state concept was invoiced, again 
involving the Isle of Man. This occurred in 1982, when the 
Manx Government banned the import of meat from Northern Ireland, 
because of the threat which was posed to tneir domestic production. 
They cased this action on the argument that, since Northern 
Ireland and the Isle of Man were part of a single member state 




























































































apply. In elfect, tney oelieved that their action should be 
construed as an internal measure outwith the scope of 
competence of the European Communities.
As might have been expected, tnis caused a reaction among
Northern Irish meat exporters and the matter was then placed
oefore the Council of the European Communities which issued,
for the first time, a Decision founded upon the safeguard
6  "lmeasures article of Protocol 3 (Art. 5) . This authorised
the United Kingdom to permit the Isle of Man to apply a system 
of special import licences for sheepmeat, beef and veal. The 
decision applies until 1 April, 1984.
From the point of view of this discussion , paragraph 7 
of the preamble to the decision is of particular relevance.
This states:
"Whereas in the context of the trade arrangements with 
certain third countries pursuant to the common organisation 
of the marxet which apply to the Isle of Man, suoject to 
the Community provisions which govern the relationship 
between the Island and tne Community, it is desirable to 
permit the Island authorities to apply certain measures 
in order to protect its own production and the working 
of its own agricultural support system".
The presumption to be made is that, in the aDsence of a special 
exemption, which here is justified with reference to similar 
exemptions in agreements with third countries, the free movement 
provisions of Community law would apply. This paragraph is also 
indicative of tne willingness of other Member States to allow 





























































































From this, one might draw the conclusion that the single
member state concept cannot be held to undermine the application
of Community rules pertaining to agriculture where the trading
relationship is Detween the Islands and the United Kingdom.
simply
The phrase should, therefore, oe understoodAas extending to
and directives
the Islands, all Community regulationsAin the agricultural field, 
to which the United Kingdom is bound, witnout the need for 
a specific reference to the Islands in the instrument.
It is interesting that, in this one respect, the Islands 
appear to have chosen the wide interpretation of the law, in 
order, paradoxically, to minimise its application.
(iv) Enactment of Community Law
Finally, a brief mention must be made of the attitude in 
the Islands to the enactment of European Community legislation.
As has been noted, they are required, in principle, to 
implement all Community Regulations and enact all Community 
Directives encompassed by the provisions of Protocol 3 and 
Regulation 706/73. In practice, it is quite impossible for 
the insular authorities to undertake such a huge administrative 
and legislative programme. It has been pointed out that in 
Jersey, and presumably tnis is the case in the other Islands, 
Community rules fill over a yard of shelfspace on the Greffe
£ O
bookshelves . The Greffier is quoted as saying, however that 
”99.99 per cent of it does not affect us”. Clearly, a far 
higher percentage should, in law, be implemented but this 
statement is indicative of the pragmatic approach which has 
been adopted and the Islands tend only to implement Community
instruments wnicn are directly relevant to them. This requires 




























































































might necessitate putting into practice, rules which previously; 
were not thought to oe relevant.
The U.K. Government provides some assistance by drawing 
important legislation to the attention of the Islands.
The Isle of Man employs a Common Market Officer whose task 
it is to examine and forward items of Community legislation 
to the various departments. They are perhaps more assiduous 
in this respect and the monthly bulletin lists the Community 
law wnich is applicaDle to the Island. It is interesting that 
no distinction appears to have been made between regulations 
and directives. The latter are regarded as effective without 
suosequent enactment oy Tynwald .
Scrutiny of Community legislation by the elected representatives 
is piecemeal. The Manx Common Market Committee has been 
disbanded and in all three Islands, European rules are 
examined, if at all, by the various sectoral committees.
Finally, returning to the Nicholson Case, we have the one 
known example of a judge considering referral under Article 
177 of the EEC Treaty. The Deputy High Bailiff appreciated that 
this possibility was available to him but decided, in the event;
"...not to follow this course as this is a criminal matter., 
and I consider the inevitable long delay unacceptable"^.
It is clearly misplaced to refuse a 177 reference on the grounds 
that the case is a criminal one. The ECJ has given many 
preliminary rulings in the past on references from criminal 
proceedings. In any case, given that the defendant company 
was found guilty, it may be that it would have been prepared 





























































































In seeking to draw conclusions from the foregoing discussion, 
it is important to emphasise that evaluation based on a single 
or small numDer of situations must, by definition, be tentative. 
Notwithstanding this, one might postulate from the cases 
discussed, a numDer of general factors which govern, and to 
an extent, undermine the relationship in strict law which was 
-estaDlished in 1973.
(1) Lack of legal clarity
The vagueness of certain provisions of Protocol 3 and 
Regulation 706/73 nas been noted. This has allowed the insular 
authorities, both administrative and judicial, a greater 
capacity for interpretation. On a more specific level, there 
is a tension between the central applicable norm relating to 
the free movement of goods and the express exclusion of the 
Islands from the Community funding provisions.
(2) The 'Minimalist' Attitude of the Islands
Bearing in mind the preceding point, the Islands have opted 
for a 'minimalist' approach with respect to European Community 
obligations. This is manifested in a number of ways:
(a) The interpretation placed on the single member state concept 
which, given that insular trade is largely with the U.K., 
minimises the application of the free movement of goods 
provisions, (b) The limited application of the equal treatment 
clause, allowing the continuation of 'discrimination' in many 
areas, (c) The policy of enacting only relevant Community 
legislation with the assessment as to relevance being made by 
the Islands' authorities, (d) The continued operation of 
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then only at the Dehest of a third party.
There are two possiDle explanations for this. Firstly, 
although the Commission is aware of insular actions, it 
does not regard them as significant in terms of the Community 
as a whole and therefore does not intervene. Secondly, the 
Commission may, in fact, De unaware of insular activities until 
a particular aspect is drawn to their attention. This latter 
explanation is, in a sense, a manifestation of 'acquiescence' 
in that the Commission, by its failure to monitor the Islands, 
clearly accords them a low priority.
The result in either case, is the absence of pressure on 
the Islands forcing them to conform with their obligations.
(4) The Influence of Individual Actors
The Islands are clearly not cut off entirely from the outside 
world and occasions will arise when individuals, on whom some 
'personality' has been conferred in the European Communities, 
are adversely affected by certain insular activities. The 
result in such cases is that the European Commission is forced 
to act, aloeit reluctantly.
(5) Conflict Avoidance
Where the Community is prevailed upon to act, conflict has
nevertheless, been avoided, to date. This can be done either
by the use of safeguard measures, allowing an exception for
the Islands or alternatively, by the Islands choosing to repeal
65the offending measures, in recognition of their obligations .
Thus, in terms of the classification of actors employed in 
Chapter 3, it may be seen that, in the situation created by 




























































































which might have been imposed by the extra actors have been 
^voided. The relationship is, in fact, characterised by a 
surprising tranquility.
This leads one to consider the effectiveness of law as an 
instrument governing the relationship between the Islands and 
the European Community. It would seem that, as with the 
constitutional situation vis a vis the United Kingdom, the 
law and the practice diverge and the Islands exercise greater 
autonomy than the legal texts allow them in principle. In 
this sense, the law may be seen to be restricted to a 'back­
up facility', should the insular autnorities overstep the 
discretionary capacity which they presently exercise with 
the implicit approuation of the other interested parties.
Finally, in connection with the European Communities, 
there emerges from the previous discussion, one point which 
was not raised by the Islands in their campaign to obtain a 
special relationship.
Even within the limited arrangement finally reached, it 
has oecome clear that the Islands are not able to implement 
all those rules which are applicaole in theory. This has 
necessitated the adoption of a 'responsive' approach based 
on the perceived relevance of Community instruments.
Had the Islands been fully included, it would have been 
impossible for their Governments to cope with the flood of 
Community rules emanating from Brussels. It would also have 
been difficult to justify a selective 'responsive' approach 
when all instruments of a general nature applied to them.
The most likely outcome would have been a huge increase in 




























































































U.K. implementation measures to the Islands.
In the light of this and tne foregoing discussion, it
would appear that European unity, as it is presently evolving,
and insular autonomy are mutually inconsistent concepts. Since
the prosperity of many peripheral (and in particular insular)
66areas is often dependent upon local autonomy , one might
postulate tnat tne process of unification at the centre is
littely to lead to 'disintegration* at tne peripheries.
In this regard, the special relationsnip negotiated for
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man may turn out to be
one of two things; eitner an aspect of the Islands' transition
to independence or tne foundation of a new European 'dependency''
model wnicn could serve as the Dasis for tnose entities which
presently enjoy a special relationsnip witn a European Member
State. In order to examine these alternatives further, it is
necessary to loox at the approacn adopted Dotn with existing
territories linxed to the Communities tnrough their metropolitan
power and and with future 'special status' areas which are
6 7part of applicant states .
Chapter 4 - Footnotes
1. See 'Report on the Possible Effects on the Isle of Man 
of United Kingdom Entry into the Common Market' by Dr.
Hugh Thurston, at page 8.
2. For more detailed studies of the expected effects of 
European Community Membership on Jersey and Guernsey,
f  -- l  i
see - 'The Jersey Report' (Ch.2, footnote 21) pp.119-124 on 
direct taxation



























































































- Economic Survey of Jersey by G.C. Powell, p.256 et seq.
- States of Guernsey Report (Ch.3 footnote 32)
5. See the Thurston Report (Isle of Man) supra p.35-36
6. Until the establishment of a separate Manx Customs and 
Excise Department, this was a factor to De considered by 
Dy companies registered in the Isle of Man. The access 
to VAT records Dy U.K. Customs officers led to fears
that the Inland Revenue could obtain information indirectly.
7. Powell supra p.256
8. For example, European Community rules on consolidation of 
accounts might require MemDer State ’parent' companies to 
disclose the financial position of their insular subsidiaries
9. For a more detailed study see:
- Thurston Report (Isle of Man) supra p.51-61
- Jersey Report p.7-9# Appendix G (Agriculture) p.125-178, 
Appendix H (Trade and the Common External Tariff) P.179- 
188 (Prepared oy Dr. Thurston)
- Guernsey States Report supra, p.713 et seq.
10. Powell supra, p.121
11. For a more detailed study, see
- Thurston Report (Isle of Man) supra p.40-50
- Jersey Report p.6-7 (VAT), Appendix E (Economic Structure) 
Appendix F (Taxation) p.112-119 on VAT.
- Powell supra p.81-83
12. In other words, a union which embraces not only customs 
duties but also excise duties and VAT rates.
13. Powell supra p.82, para.262
•* < 3 ' ■ -  . ' :'r • % • • -  > r  v -  •. ' - v  , •
14. The corresponding articles of the ECSC Treaty and the
Euratom Treaty are Articles 79(l) and 198 respectively



































































































Regulation (EEC) No. 706/73 of the Council of 12 March, 1973, 
L.68/73
See the preamble to Reg.706/73, at the sixth paragraph, 
which sets out tne exclusion of the Islands from Community 
financing.
The difficulty, which became clear during interviews 
conducted in the Islands, was in quantifying the amount of 
aid provided in Community Countries.
See European Communities Commission, information sheet 
BN/2/1S79 entitled 'Territories with Special Relationships 
with Britain and the European Community'. In this, it is 
stated that:
"...to ensure the maintenance of free trade, tne 
European Commission, under Article 93 of tne Rome 
Treaty, has power to vet local aid scnemes to industry 
as with full members of the Community" (my underlining). 
See Colin Powell, The Channel Islands and the Common Market, 
the Tnree Banks Review, No. 95, 1972, p.49 at p.59. Powell 
states:
"the Protocol to the Treaty of Accession... requires the 
Islands not to discriminate between nationals of the 
United Kingdom and those of other member countries of 
the EEC in tne local job market" (my underlining)
See Edward Owen, The Battle for Special Terms - Jersey and 
the Common Market in 'The Islander', .June 1980, p33* 
first paragraph of p.34
supra, footnote 18. The Commission document states: 
"...although Treaty provisions relating to Free Movement 




























































































the islanders, nationals of all countries of the Community
* T »
including the United Kingdom, must receive identical 
treatment within the territories..."
22. European Communities (Jersey) Law, 1973
European Communities (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 1973'.
European Communities (Isle of Man) Act, 1973.
23. The basic provision at Article 2 is:
"2(l) All such rights, powers, liaDilities, oDligations and 
restrictions from time to time created or arising by or 
under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties 
as... in accordance wi in tne Treaties are witnout further 
enactment to be given legal effect or used in (the Island) 
snail, in (the Island) be recognised and available in law, 
and be enforced, allowed and followed accordingly and the 
expression 'enforceable Community right' and similar 
expressions shall be read as referring to one to which 
tnis suusection applies"
24. Article 3(1) in both the insular laws and tne U.K. Act.
25. Interim Report of the Tynwald Select Committee on the 
Common. Marset, para 5.4 pages 4,5.
26. ibid p.21, para.32 of the Advice tendered by MR. M.E. Bathurst, 
Constitutional Advisor to Tynwald.
27. ibid para.34
28. The criteria for the allocation of monies collected under 
the Common Purse were described in the Review of the Isle 
of Man - U.K. Common Purse Arrangement by P.A. Management 
Consultants Ltd at p.71 et seq. Briefly, the Manx share 




























































































duty paid in the Isle of Man (ii) The Manx resident 
population as a percentage of the total United Kingdom 
and Isle of Man population (iii) The Manx 'fiscal' population 
as a percentage of the total United Kingdom and Isle of 
Man population.This last criterion is 'in effect, the 
numoer of extra full time residents who would oe required 
on the Island to provide the same amount of duty as that 
contributed oy visitors8.
29. For example, the Islands' Milk Marketing Boards and the 
Isle of Man FatstocK MarKeting Association.
30. For a Milk MarKeting Board or similar organisation to be 
authorised, the Dasic requirements are:
(a) it is supported by at least 80% of the milk producers 
estaDlisned in the area covered oy the Board.
(b) Tnese producers represent at least b0% of the milk 
production in that area.
(c) Tne percentage of milk used for direct human consumption 
must be at least l| times greater than the corresponding 
average for the Community as a wnole.
31. See Second Interim Report of the Tynwald Select Committee 
on the Common Market - opinion by Mr. Bathurst annexed, at 
p.l paras.3 & 4.
32. Official Journal L.171, 28th June 1978, containing Council 
Regulation (EEC) No.1421/78 of 20th June 1978 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No.804/68 on the Common Organisation of 
the Market in Milk and Milk Products.
33. See Billet d'Etat, Wednesday 30 July, 1980 p.511. States 
Committee for Horticulture 'Financial Support Contingency 




























































































34. ibid p.519 Summary of Recommendations
35. ibid p.513 Support Measures - contingency plan.
36. European Parliament - written question 1250/80 oy Mr. Welsh 
to the Commission on the proposed export subsidy for 
Guernsey tomatoes. 6 Oct. 1980 OJ C.335/14
37. The Order was made under the provisions of Section 25 of 
the Agricultural Marketing Act, 1954.
38. Michael John Ball, an officer of the Isle of Man Board of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Nicholson (Isle of Man) Ltd, 
at the Petty Sessions, District of Douglas, Isle of Man,
9th July 1980.
39. The Deputy High Bailiff was tne judge in the case.
40. ibid p.5 of judgement
41. ibid
42. Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food,
(1968) , 1 All E.R. p.694
Chertsey UDC v Mixnam's Properties Ltd, (1964) 2 All E.R. p.629
43. See footnote 37 supra
ii
44. p.8 of judgement
45. p.9 of judgement
46. p.10 of judgement
47. p.12 of judgement
48. Made under the Import and Export (Control)(Jersey) Law,
1946. Recuiel des Lois, Tome VII p.338, Jersey States 
Greffe, 1982, 7074.
49. This justification was put forward during interviews in 
Jersey with States Officials, April, 1983.
50. Made under powers conferred by the Order in Council of 14 





























































































States Greffe, 1983, 7166
. Tnis Order is in French since tnis was the language of the 
enaoling Order in Council
52. The possioility tnat this line of action would be adopted 
was suggested during interviews in Jersey with States' 
officials.
53. See P.A. Management Report on the Common Purse, supra.
54. ibid and footnote 28.
55. The right of the Isle of Man to abrogate from the agreement 
unilaterally has been recognised. See ibid, p.l summary of 
findings, no.7.
56. See Report and Recommendations concerning Aorogation of
the Common Purse Agreement, Decemoer 1982, by tne Isle of 
Industry
Man TouristALiason Committee.
57. supra footnote 53.
Also Report of the Finance Board on Customs and the Common 
Purse Arrangement, Finance Department, October 1966 and 
various Reports of the Tynwald Select Committee on the 
Common Purse.
58. I am grateful to Mr. G. Sanders from the Isle of Man who 
pointed out to me the possible applications of Article 4 
of Protocol 3.
59. One 'side-effect* of this parity is that the Isle of Man 
does not enjoy complete tax sovereignty or control over 
its own revenue. U.K. budgetary decisions on excise and 
VAT rates have a direct impact on the Island.
60. This was indicated during interviews in Guernsey and Jersey 
with officials, April 1983.




























































































permit the Isle of Man authorities to apply a system of 
special import licences to sheepmeat and beef and veal. 
82/530/EEC, O.J. L.234/7, 9.8.82
62. See Edward Owen supra, footnote 20.
63. On the face of it, this is possible under Article 2(l) 
of the European Communities (Isle of Man) Act, 1973.
64. page 13 of judgement.
65. See footnote 60.
6b. This thesis is advanced by Kermode in. Devolution at Work 
a Case Study of tne Isle of Man, in which the development 
of the Isle of Man is contrasted with the decline of the 
Scottish islands.
67. This is a subject for wider study. In this connection, 
nowever, it is noteworthy tnat the Faroe Islands
chose to remain outside the European Communities and Greenland 
is soon to leave. To date, very little is known about the 
arrangements which will oe made for the Azores, Madeira and 
the Canary Islands, on the admission of Portugal and Spain 





























































































The Isle of Man and the Channel Islands - Basic Facts
Appendix I
I.of Man Jersey Guernsey
Population1 64,679 77,000 56,000
Area 572 km2 34 116 km2 78 km2
pGovernment
Revenue £97.2m £118.5m £61.4m
2Government
Expenditure £97.2m £94.3m £70.lm
3Imports not available £230.9m not available

















Registered? not available 16643 7295
Bank^
Deposits £1,200m £13,000m £3,000m
Standard Rate 
of Income Tax 20% 20% 20%
Value Added 
Tax 15% no VAT no VAT.
1. Isle of Man, 1981 Census; Channel Islands, 1981 estimate.
2. Isle of Man, 1983-4 projection; Jersey, 1981 figure, 
Guernsey, 1983 projection including expenditure on the 
capital account. Guernsey is drawing on its accumulated 
reserves for capital projects in 1983. In previous years 
there has been a surplus of revenue over expenditure.
3. No separate figures are available foi* the Isle of Man 
because of the Customs Union with the U.K. which allows 
completely unrestricted movement of goods, without Customs 
procedures; Jersey, 1980 figures
4. Isle of Man - In 1979/80 income generated in basic sectors 
of the Manx economy was as follows: Finance 22%, Manufact­
uring industry 14%,, Tourism 12%, Agriculture 2\%. Public 




























































































The three principal manufacturing sectors are (i) 
Engineering, (ii) Textiles, Clothing and Footwear and 
(iii) Food and Drink. Exports are generally directed 
through the United Kingdom.
Tourist arrivals from May 1st to September 31st fluctuate 
between 450,000 and 650,000.
The agriculture industry caters mainly for home consumption 
although sheep carcases are exported in some quantity. 
(13,700 in 1978) There is also a sizeable export market 
for herring and other fish products (8,700 tonnes in 
1976)
Jersey - The finance and bamcing centres account for approx­
imately i of the national income while wealthy immigrants 
contriDute a furtner 23 - 24%.
Tourism remains a vital contributor to Jersey's wealth and, 
in 1980, passenger arrivals by sea and air amounted to 
1,340,000.
The main agricultural/horticultural products are potatoes, 
tomatoes and livestock, the first- two being exported in 
large quantities. Some 40,000 tonnes of potatoes are 
-exported to the U.K., mainly during the early season 
before local new potatoes become available.
There is a policy to attract more light industry to the 
island as a means of further diversifying the economy. 
Present industrial activity includes electronics and the 
manufacture of traditional knitwear.
Guernsey - Although lagging behind Jersey in terms of 
overall financial activity, Guernsey's finance 'industry' 
contributes a proportionately larger amount to national 
income (approximately 40%). Guernsey also differs from 
Jersey in being the major offshore centre for Captive 
Insurance Companies, outside Bermuda. There are now some 
120 captives established in Guernsey.
The importance of the tourist industry is reflected in 
the passenger arrival figures for Guernsey (357,000 in 
1980)
The main horticultural activity continues to be tomatoes 
although this has been in decline for the last ten years. 




























































































Cut flowers and plants have been expanded to take up some 
of the spare growing capacity and exports in this field 
were worth £12.3m in 1980.
In light industry, the biggest sector is electronics.
Other manufacturing activities include packaging, knitwear, 
pharmaceuticals, boat building and food processing.
5. Channel Islands, 1982 figures.























































































































































































The Report of the Joint WorKing Party on the Constitutional
Relationship between the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom, 
(HMSO 1969).
The main principles of the constitutional relationship, set
out on page 3, are as follows:
"(i) Parliament at Westminster has ultimate legislative
supremacy, not only in respect of the United Kingdom, 
but also in respect of a number of territories including 
the Isle of Man as a dependency of the Crown,
(ii) The Crown has ultimate responsibility for the good 
government of the Isle of Man.
(iii) The Crown, in its widest sense, acting through the
United Kingdom Government, is responsible for (a) the 
defence and (b) the international relations of the 
Isle of Man.
(iv) The government and legislature of the Isle of Man are 
autonomous in respect of matterswhich do not transcend 
the frontiers of the Isle of Man (which include the 
land mass, territorial waters, ground Deneath territorial 
waters and air space above the land mass and territorial 
waters); including (but not limited to) the levying, 
the collection and the control of insular revenues; 
finance; agriculture and fisheries; criminal law; harbours 
mineral rights; police; social services, trade and 
professions.
(v) Legislation passed by the legislature of the Isle of 
Man, after being signed by the Lieutenant-Governor and 
memoers of the legislature, requires the Royal Assent 
in order to complete its enactment.
(vi) When insular legislation is submitted to Her Majesty 
for Assent, advice is tendered by the Privy Council.
At present, under the general Order made at the 
Deginning of the reign, legislation stands referred 
to the Committee of the Privy Council charged with 
Manx affairs."
These principles are also applicable to the relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the Channel Islands. See the 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution,, Chapter 
31, paragraphs 1348 and 1360-1363 (pp.408-411). Also,
Minutes of Evidence, Volume 6, the Memorandum of the States 
of Jersey at pages 103-104 and the Memorandum of the States 
of Guernsey at pages 228-230. A separate Committee of the 





























































































(l) Foreign Office Circular No.0118 (TF. 11/5) - October 16, 1950
Position of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man in 
Relation to Treaties and International Agreements.
I have to inform you that His Majesty's Government in the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have 
recently had under consideration the position of the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man in relation to treaties and 
international agreements applicable to the United Kingdom.
2. Although in municipal law, the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man do not form part of the United Kingdom, His Majesty's 
Government have hotherto regarded such treaties and international 
agreements as applying to those Islands unless, in the case of 
any particular treaty or agreement, the contrary has been 
expressly stated in the instrument itself.
3. His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion 
that it would be more consistent with the constitutional 
position of these Islands to regard them for international 
purposes as not forming part of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland.
4. Accordingly, any treaty or international agreement to 
which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may 
Decome a party after the date of the present dispatch will not 
be considered as applying to the Channel Islands or the Isle 
of Man by reason only of the fact that it applies to the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and any 
signature, ratification, acceptance or accession on behalf of 
the United Kingdom will not extend to the Islands unless they 
are expressly included. For the purpose of any treaty or 
international agreement to which his Majesty's Government may 
become a party hereafter, the Channel Islands and the Isle
of Man will, unless the contrary is expressly stated, in each 
case be included among the territories for whose international 
relations His Majesty's Government are responsible.
5. I have to request that you will notify the Government of 
the country in which you reside of this decision, conveying
to them the information contained in the preceding paragraphs 




























































































similar terms, bearing this day's date has been addressed to 
their diplomatic representative in London and that all foreign 
Governments with whom His Majesty's Government are in diplomatic 
relationship, the United Nations, the International Labour 
Office and other international organisations concerned have 
been similarly informed.
6. I have to add that you should explain, if the question 
is asked as to the position of the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man under existing treaties, that the step now being 
taken does not affect the application of existing treaties to 
those Islands.
Ernest Bevin.
Tne principles of this declaration were set out in a letter 
to the insular authorities dated March 8, 1951 which is not 
reproduced here.
(2) The Position of the Channel Islands in Relation to Inter­
national Agreements
Home Office, 
Whitehall, London SW1 
December 30, 1966
Sir,
I am directed by the Secretary of State to refer to the 
Home Office letter of March 8, 1951, conveying the decision, 
which had been communicated in a declaration to foreign govern­
ments and international organisations, that the Channel Islands 
and the Isle of Man should no longer be regarded for inter­
national purposes as forming part of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The letter further pointed 
out that, following the declaration, the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man would normally be included, for treaty purposes, 
among the (non-metropolitan) 'territories for whose international 
relations Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are 
responsible". Many international agreements contain an article 
enabling States which become parties to the agreement to extend 
its application to dependent territories 'for whose international 




























































































decision conveyed in the letter of March 8, 1951, was, 
therefore (a) to ensure that the Islands would be regarded 
for treaty purposes not as part of the metropolitan territory 
of the United Kingdom but as 'countries for whose international 
relations Her Majesty's Government are responsible'; and 
(b) to make it possible for the United Kingdom to extend 
agreements containing such an article to the Channel Islands, 
and the Isle of Man, at a convenient time, after the United 
Kingdom had become a party. The Secretary of State understands, 
however, that some difficulty had arisen over the application 
of certain types of international agreement, and he thinks 
that the following statement amplifying the letter of March 8, 
1951, would be useful.
The extent of territorial application of an international 
agreement is a matter to oe determined by the agreement itself 
in accordance with the decisions at the negotiations; it may 
be shown expressly or by specifying the territories in relation 
to which a contracting party is to be bound, or by implication. 
The decision conveyed in the letter of March 8. 1951 did not 
change and could not have changed the rule of international 
law, under which the signature, ratification or accession of 
any State to an international agreement is presumed to be in 
respect not only of the State itself but of all the territories 
for whose international relations it is responsible, unless 
this presumption is displaced by the wording of the agreement 
itself or by necessary implication. Such a presumption would 
be displaced, for example, by the inclusion of an article 
enabling contracting parties to apply the agreement to 
dependent territories, which would show that, in the absence of 
such application, the initial acceptance was confined to the 
metropolitan territory of contracting parties. In the absence of 
any express or implied limitation of territorial extent, however, 
a States's acceptance of obligations in an agreement would be 
held to include acceptance on behalf of all its dependent 
territories. The position then is that the United Kingdom's 
acceptance of agreements containing no indication of limited 




























































































dependent territories including the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man. Before concluding such agreements, however,
Her Majesty's Government will always endeavour to discuss 



























































































































































































Act of Accession : Protocol No. 3 on the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man
Article 1
1. The Community rules on customs matters and quantitative 
restrictions, in particular, those of the Act of Accession, 
shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man under 
the same conditions as they apply to tne United Kingdom. In 
particular, customs duties and cnar6es having equivalent 
effect between tnose territories and the Community as orig­
inally constituted and between those territories and the new 
Member States snail oe progressively reduced in accordance with 
the timetable laid down in Articles 32 and 36 of tne Act of 
Accession. The Common Customs Tariff and tne ECSC unified 
tariff shall be progressively applied in accordance with the 
timetable laid down in Articles 39 and 59 of the Act of Accession, 
and account being tarcen of Articles 109,110 and 119 of the Act.
2. In respect of agricultural products, and products processed 
therefrom which are the subject of a special trade regime, the 
levies and other import measures laid down in Community rules 
and applicable by the United Kingdom, shall be applicaole to 
third countries.
Such provisions of Community rules, in particular those of 
the Act of Accession, as are necessary to allow free movement 
and observance of normal conditions of competition in trade in 
these products shall also be applicable.
The Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission shall determine the conditions under 
which the provisions referred to in the preceding paragraphs 
shall be applicable to these territories.
Article 2
The rignts enjoyed oy Channel Islanders or Manxmen in the 
United Kingdom shall not be affected by the Act of Accession. 
However, such persons shall not uenefit from Community 





























































































The provisions of the Euratom Treaty applicable to persons 
or undertakings witnin the meaning of Article 196 of that Treaty 
shall apply to those persons or undertakings when they are 
estadished in tne aforementioned territories.
Article 4
The authorities of these territories shall apply the same 
treatment to all natural and legal persons of the Community.
Article 5
If, during the application of the arrangments defined in 
this Protocol, difficulties appear on either side in relations 
between the Community and these territories, the Commission shall, 
without delay propose to the Council such safeguard measures 
as it oelieves necessary, specifying tneir terms and conditions 
of application.
The Council shall act by a qualified majority within one month.
Article 6
In tnis Protocol, Channel Islander or Manxman shall mean 
any citizen of tne United Kingdom and Colonies who holds that 
citizenship oy virtue of the fact that he, a parent or grandparent 
was corn, adopted, naturalised or registered in the island in 
question; out such a person shall not for this purpose be 
regarded as a Channel Islander or Manxman if he, a parent or 
a grandparent was born, adopted naturalised or registered in 
the United Kingdom. Nor shall he be so regarded if he has at 
any time been ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom for 
five years.
Tne administrative arrangements necessary to identify these 





























































































Regulation (EEC) No. 706/73 of the Council of 12 March, 1973 
concerning the Community arrangements applicable to the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man for trade in agricultural products, 
(operative provisions only)
Article 1
1. Community rules applicable to the United Kingdom for trade 
in agricultural products covered by Annex II to the Treaty 
estaolishing the European Economic Community and in goods 
covered by Regulation No. 170/67/EEC and Regulation (EEC) No. 
1059/69, shall apply to the Island with the exception of rules 
on refunds and on compensatory amounts granted on exports by 
the United Kingdom.
2. For the purpose of applying the rules referred to in paragraph 
1, tne United Kingdom and the Islands shall be treated as a 
single Mernoer State.
3. No refund or compensatory amount shall be granted in respect 
of the products referred to in paragraph 1, originating in or 
coming from these islands, in respect of which customs formalities 
are completed in a Member State.
4. Where the products referred to in paragraph 1 are exported to 
third countries , the Islands may not grant aid in excess of
the refunds or compensatory amounts which may De granted by the 
United Kingdom, in accordance with Community rules, on exports 
to tnird countries.
5. Where the products referred to in Paragraph 1 are exported 
to Member States, the Islands may not grant aid in excess of 
any amounts which may be granted by the United Kingdom, in 
accordance with Community rules, on exports to other Mernoer States.
Article 2




























































































concerned, the provisions of Article 93(l) and the first 
sentence of Article 93(3) of the treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community shall apply.
The Council acting oy a qualified majority on a proposal from 
the Commission snail make the otner provisions of Articles 
92,93 and 94 of the Treaty applicaole insofar as this proves 
necessary.
Article 3
As from 1 September 1973, the Community rules applicable in 
tne matter of:
- veterinary legislation
- animal health legislation
- plant health legislation
- marketing of seeds and seedlings
- food legislation
- feeding stuffs legislation
- quality and marxeting standards
snail apply under tne same conditions as in the United Kingdom 
to tne products referred to in Article 1 imported into the 
islands or exported from the Islands to the Community, the 
veterinary le0islation being applicable under the same conditions 
as in the United Kingdom in respect of Northern Ireland.
Article 4
Detailed rules for the application of Article 1, in particular 
rules to prevent def— lections of trade shall be adopted in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 26 of Council 
Regulation No. 120/67/EEC of 13 June 1967 on the common 
organisation of the market in cereals as law amended by the 
Act of Accession or in the corresponding Article of other 
Regulations on tne common organisation of tne markets as the 
case may be.
Article 5
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day of its 
puolication in tne Official Journal....



























































































Appendix VI - The Internal Constitutional Structures of the Islands
Taken from the Europa Yearbook, 1982
Tne Isle of Man (Europa Yearbook p.1400)
'•The Constitution
The Isle of Man is governed by its own laws. Tynwald is the 
legislative Dody, and consists of Doth branches of the legislature, 
that is, the Legislative Council and the House of Keys, sitting 
together as one body, but voting separately on all questions 
except, in certain eventualities, the appointment of Boards of 
Tynwald, The House of Keys has 24 members chosen Dy adult suffrage 
for five years. The Legislative Council is composed of a President, 
the Lieutenant-Governor, the Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man and 
eight members elected by the House of Keys. Customs duties, some 
indirect taxation and income-tax come witnin the province of 
Tynwald. The Isle of Man Act, 1958, gave tne Tynwald greater 
control of fiscal matters. An Executive Council of five members 
of the House of Keys and two of the Legislative Council was set 
up in 1961, to act with the Governor.
Judicial System
The Isle of Man is, for legal purposes, an independent sovereign 
country under the British Crown with its own Legislature and its 
own Judiciary administering its own common or customary and statute 
law. The law of the Isle of Man is, in most essential matters, 
the same as the law of England and general principles of equity, 




























































































the Isle of Man unless they conflict with established local 
precedents. Her Majesty's High Court of Justice of the Isle of 
Man is Dased upon tne English system but modified and simplified 
to meet local conditions. Justices of the Peace are appointed 
oy the Lord Chancellor of England usually on the nomination of 
the Lieutenant-Governor. Memoers of the Legislative Council, the 
High 5ailiff, Deputy High Bailiff and the Mayor of Douglas and 
the Chairman of Town and Village Commissioners are ex officio J.P.s"
For a fuller account of the internal constitution of the Isle of 
Man see 'Report of tne Commission on the Isle of Man Constitution' 
(Tne MacDermott Report), 14th March, 1959. Norris Modern Press 
Ltd., Douglas.
Jersey (Europa Yearbook p.1404)
"The Constitution
The Lieutenant-Governor and the Commander in Chief of Jersey is 
the personal representative of the Sovereign, the Commander of 
the Armed forces of the Crown and the channel of communication 
oetween Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the 
Insular Government. He is appointed by the Crown and is entitled 
to sit and speak in the Assembly of the States, but not to vote.
He has a veto on certain forms of legislation.
The Bailiff is appointed by the Crown, and is President both 
of the Assembly of tne States (the Insular Legislature) and the 
Royal Court of Jersey. He has, in the States, a right of dissent 
and a casting vote.




























































































authorised Dy the Bailiff to do so, may discharge any function
appertaining to the office of Bailiff.
The Government of tne Island is conducted Dy Committees
appointed Dy the States. The States consist of 12 Senators
(elected for six years, six retiring every third year), 12 «
Constaoles (Triennial), and 28 Deputies (Triennial), all elected 
under universal suffrage, by the people. The Dean of Jersey, 
tne Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General are appointed oy 
the Crown and are entitled to sit and speak in the States, bot 
not to vote. Permanent laws passed by the States require the 
sanction of Her Majesty in Council but Triennial Regulations do 
not.
The,official language is French but English is the language 
in daily use.
Judicial System
Justice is administered in Jersey by the Royal Court, which 
consists of the Bailiff or Deputy Bailiff and twelve Jurats 
elected by an Electoral College. There is a Court of Appeal 
which consists of the Bailiff (or Deputy Bailiff) and two 
Judges, selected from a panel appointed by the Crown. A final 
appeal lies to tne Privy Council in certain cases.
A Stipendiary Magistrate deals with minor civil and criminal 
cases. He also acts as Examining Magistrate in criminal matters".
For a fuller account of the internal constitution of Jersey, 
see ’The Law of the Channel Islands, II. The Constitution of the 





























































































Guernsey (Europa Yearoook p.1407)
"The Constitution
Tne Lieutenant-Governor and Commander in Chief of Guernsey 
is the Personal Representative of the Sovereign and the channel 
of communication oetween Her Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom and the Insular Government. He is appointed by the Crown.
He is entitled to sit and speak in the AssemDly of the States, 
bit not to vote.
The Bailiff is appointed by the Crown and is President, both 
of the Assembly of the States (the insular legislature) and of 
the Royal Court of Guernsey and has a casting vote.
Tne Government of tne island is conducted by committees 
appointed Dy tne States.
The States of Delioeration is composed of the following members:
(a) The Bailiff, wno is President ex-officio
(d) Twelve Conseillers elected oy the States of Election (elected 
for six years, six retiring every three years)
(c) H.M. Attorney-General and H.M. Solicitor-General (Law Officers 
of tne Crown), who have a voice but not a vote.
(d) Thirty-three People's Deputies elected Dy popular franchise
(e) Ten Douzaine Representatives elected by their respective 
Parochial Douzaines
(f) Two Alderney Representatives elected by the States of Alderney 
The Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General are appointed
oy the Crown, and are entitled to sit and speak in the States, but 
not to vote.





























































































The functions of the States of Election is to elect persons 
to tne offices of Jurat and Conseiller. It is composed of the 
following memoers:
(a) Tne Bailiff (President ex-officio)
(b) The 12 Jurats or "Jures-Justiciers"
(c) The 12 Conseillers
(d) H.M. Attorney-General and H.M. Solicitor-General
(e) Tne 33 People's Deputies
(f) Thirty-four Douzaine Representatives
(g) Four Alderney representatives for the election of Conseillers 
only.
Meetings of tne States and of the Royal Court formerly conducted 
in French, are now conducted in English but the proceedings in 
Doth are begun and ended in French. English is the language in 
common use but the Norman patois is often heard in the country 
parishes.
Judicial System
Justice is administered in Guernsey by the Royal Court which 
consists of the Bailiff and the twelve Jurats. The Royal Court 
also deals with a wide variety of non-contentious matters.
An acting Magistrate deals with minor civil and criminal 
cases.
The Guernsey Court of Appeal deals with Appeals from the 
Royal Court".
For a fuller account of the internal constitution of Guernsey, 
see 'The Constitution of Guernsey', D. Ehmann and M. Marshall, 
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